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Abstract
The first essay explains why credit contracts in developing countries are often denominated
in foreign currencies, even after many of these economies succeeded in controlling inflation. I
propose a new interpretation based on the demand for insurance against real aggregate shocks.
The fact that devaluations occur more frequently in adverse states of the world provides a
motive for holding dollar assets when the risk of recession is the main source of volatility in
consumption. The model predicts persistence in the degree of "dollarization" in economies with
low inflationary risk.
The second essay looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects the
capacity of resident agents to optimally diversify risk. I find that government's moral hazard
introduces a trade-off between pooling idiosyncratic risk and diversifying aggregate country
uncertainty. As a result, local agents face excessive consumption risk. This paper also explores
how institutions can be designed as to overcome this moral hazard problem.
The third essay proposes an explanation for the variation across countries in the quality
of the institutions governing the financial. The explanation based on the proportion of local
investors participating in the domestic financial sector. I find that the participation of local
investors in the financial market and, correspondingly, the resulting institutions vary according
to wealth distribution and the size of capital inflows.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Developing economies are often characterized by weak institutions. One way of formalizing them
is to assume that governments cannot commit to policies. Instead, only policies that are ex-
post optimal can be credibly implemented. As a result, emerging markets must function in poor
institutional environments, face high sovereign risk, and must resort to very costly commitment
devices that are sub-optimal from an ex-ante perspective. This dissertation explores different
implication of government's problem of moral hazard.
The first essay analyzes the interaction between government's optimal exchange rate policy
and the currency denomination of credit contracts. Credit contracts in developing countries
are often denominated in foreign currencies, even after many of these economies succeeded
in controlling inflation. I propose a new interpretation of this apparent puzzle based on the
demand for insurance against real aggregate shocks. The fact that devaluations occur more
frequently in adverse states of the world provides a motive for holding dollar assets when
the risk of recession is the main source of volatility in consumption. This approach implies
a complementarity between government's ex-post optimal monetary policy and the currency
denomination of contracts. When a large proportion of liabilities is denominated in a foreign
currency, the optimal exchange rate volatility is low. This raises the vulnerability of the economy
to aggregate shocks and reinforces the demand for dollar assets. Based on this complementarity,
the model predicts persistence in the degree of "dollarization" in economies with low inflationary
risk.
The second essay looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects
7
the capacity of resident agents to optimally diversify risk. Fiscal policy and taxation in par-
ticular play an important role in the insurance of local agents against income fluctuations.
Government's power to impose taxes is a key tool for optimal redistribution among residents.
And, since public debt represents future local tax income, fiscal policy also plays a role in
the international risk sharing. I find that government's moral hazard introduces a trade-off
between pooling idiosyncratic risk and diversifying aggregate country uncertainty. As a result,
local agents face excessive consumption risk. This paper also explores how institutions can be
designed as to overcome this moral hazard problem.
The third paper analyzes why the quality of the institutions governing the financial sector
varies across countries. The analysis is based on the incentives of the government to protect
investors, which depends on the size of the domestic financial market and the proportion of
local investors pariticipating in it. I find that the participation of local investors and, therefore,
the optimal level of investor protection varies with domestic wealth distribution and the size of
capital inflows.
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Chapter 2
Persistence of Dollarization after
Price Stabilization
2.1 Introduction
A large share of credit contracts among residents in developing countries is denominated in
foreign currencies, mainly dollars.1 It is often argued that this affects the vulnerability of these
economies to real shocks and the ability of their monetary policies to deal with them.2 This
domestic aspect of the phenomenon known as "dollarization" is associated in many cases with
a history of large inflationary episodes. Denominating contracts in a foreign currency protects
borrowers and lenders against inflationary risk. It is thus unsurprising that countries with high
inflation rates are more likely to adopt dollar denominated contracts. However, during the last
decade many such countries have made substantial progress in controlling inflation and yet the
share of dollar denominated assets in these economies remains high. Figure 2-1 illustrates this
phenomenon: the share of dollar denominated deposits in Peru and Bulgaria increased together
with the inflationary risk. However, although these countries managed to reduce inflation, their
1As an approximation for the domestic demand of foreign denominated assets, see table in appendix 7.2:
share of foreign denominated deposits in selected countries.
2The level of dollarization is found to increase the likelihood of crisis and the vulnerability of the economy
towards real exchange rate perturbations. See Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001), and Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejia (2004). For a theoretical approach, see, among others, Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2003), Chang and Velasco
(1999), Krugman (1999), and Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001).
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banking systems remain heavily dollarized.3 This persistence in the currency denomination of
credit contracts suggests that dollar instruments fulfill some other role apart from protection
against inflationary risk.
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Note: Different degrees of legal restrictions to foreign currency denominated deposits were imposed in
Peru between 1985 and 1989.
Sources: Data on inflation from IFS-IMF, data on deposits denomination from Levy-Yeyati (2003) and
data on legal restrictions on dollar deposits from Arteta (2002, 2003).
Figure 2-1: Share of Foreign Denominated Deposits
The main contribution of this paper is to reassess the motives behind domestic dollarization.
I propose a new interpretation of this apparent puzzle based on the demand for insurance
against real shocks. Because devaluations occur more frequently during recessions, dollar assets
provide insurance in economies with incomplete financial markets. The devaluation response to
aggregate shocks increases the contingent value of dollar assets. I argue that monetary policy
can improve the capacity of an incomplete set of instruments to approximate complete financial
markets.
Having analyzed the motive underlying the denomination of credit contracts, I look at the
interaction between the currency composition of the credit market and the Central Bank's opti-
mal devaluation response to aggregate shocks. I show how the demand for dollar assets distorts
the Central Bank's policy, and, in turn, market's expectations of the devaluation response alters
investors' portfolio choice. This interaction may result in multiple equilibria: an equilibrium
with a high degree of dollarization in which the Central Bank minimizes price fluctuations; 4
3See Appendix 7.3 for a broader selection of countries.
4The reluctance of the monetary authority to let the exchange rate fluctuate in economies with large share
of dollar liabilities has been emphasized in the literature on "fear of floating" and "original sin" (Calvo and
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and another in which contracts are mainly denominated in domestic currency and monetary
policy is highly countercyclical. Based on this complementarity, the model explains persistence
in the share of dollar liabilities in economies with low inflationary risk.
The model has three building blocks. First, consumers and entrepreneurs share risk in a
small economy subject to a real aggregate shock. The model emphasizes that in emerging
economies, in which a significant fraction of consumers do not have access to foreign assets, the
domestic corporate sector has a double role. It is both a producer of goods and services and a
major supplier of financial instruments. I simplify the analysis by assuming that consumers are
risk averse and entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Entrepreneurs can therefore provide insurance to
consumers. However, because they are protected by limited liability and bankruptcies are costly,
the ability of firms to provide insurance is limited. Improving insurance requires larger payments
from the corporate sector to consumers during recessions, precisely when firms' revenues are
lower. Thus, smoothing consumption exacerbates their probability of default. In other words,
there is a trade-off between insurance and default risk.
Second, credit markets are incomplete and credit contracts cannot be written contingent
on the realization of the real aggregate shock. Instead, contracts can be denominated in for-
eign (dollar) or domestic (peso) currency. These assets enable consumers to trade-off between
insurance and default risk. Because devaluations are more likely to occur in bad states of the
world, dollar assets provide insurance against the risk of recessions, though they face larger de-
fault risk.5 On the other hand, because devaluation and inflation are positively correlated, real
payments of peso debt are lower in bad states. Thus, peso assets involve lower default risk at
the expense of a more uneven consumption schedule. The ability of these assets to approximate
complete financial markets depends on the magnitude of the devaluation response to aggregate
shocks.
Finally, there is a time inconsistency problem in the Central Bank's optimal devaluation
response along the lines of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). At
the time of the monetary intervention, credit contracts have already been set. The degree of
Reinhart, 2000 and 2002; Hausmann, 1999; Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein, 2001).
5See Chamon (2001) for a model where the correlation between default and depreciation explains the currency
denomination of foreign debt. And Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) using the same feature in a model explaining
incentives for dollarization in domestic banking system.
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dollarization of the credit market affects the Central Bank's optimal policy. However, the ex-
post optimal policy feeds back into credit market expectations and determines borrowers' and
lenders' choice of contract denomination. The interplay between market expectations and the
Central Bank's optimal policy creates the need for commitment. Under full commitment, the
optimal monetary policy enables dollar and peso assets to replicate a complete financial market.
Conversely, the monetary authority's lack of commitment implies a suboptimal (from an ex-
ante perspective) monetary policy. In this case, the Central Bank pushes the economy towards
a default risk below the ex-ante optimum and, as a consequence, consumers are underinsured.
Under lack of commitment, the interplay between the currency composition of debt and the
Central Bank's optimal policy may result in multiple equilibria: an equilibrium with full dol-
larization in which the Central Bank minimizes exchange rate volatility; and another in which
contracts are mainly denominated in domestic currency and monetary policy is highly counter-
cyclical. Under full dollarization, real aggregate shocks have larger impact on output. However,
when insurance against the risk of recession is the motive behind dollarization, consumers are
better off under full dollarization than with a high share of peso denominated contracts. Indeed,
if credit contracts are mainly denominated in pesos, the Central Bank succeeds in reducing the
number of defaulting firms at the expense of a more volatile return on savings. As a result, the
problem of underinsurance is exacerbated.
The model provides some useful policy implications regarding the dollarization dilemma. It
rationalizes the observed positive impact of inflation risk on the share of foreign currency de-
nominated contracts. Nevertheless, it predicts that price stabilization will have limited efficacy
in reducing dollarization. The model also casts doubts on the effectiveness of CPI-indexed in-
struments in reducing the level of dollarization. CPI-indexed bonds do not provide contingency
against recessions. On the contrary, they are useful only when inflationary risk is the main
source of volatility in consumption. Finally, the paper explores the implications of improving
the access of atomistic borrowers and lenders to foreign capital. Unlike domestic dollar assets,
foreign instruments can perfectly insure consumers against the country risk. The trade-off be-
tween insurance and default risk disappears and consumers are better off if the Central Bank
pursues a countercyclical monetary policy.
The motives underlying domestic dollarization are analyzed in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (1998,
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2003) and Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003). The interaction between monetary policy and the
degree of domestic dollarization is also present in Chamon and Hausmann (2002), Ize and Powell
(2004), and Chang and Velasco (2004). However, the role of dollar assets in providing insurance
against the risk of recession has not been emphasized.
This paper builds on the insurance view of monetary policy emphasized in Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998, 2002) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003). As in Holmstrom and Ti-
role (1998), monetary policy is understood as an insurance policy in the presence of aggregate
risk. The role of foreign currency denominated assets in providing insurance against country
risk is also present in Holmstrom and Tirole (2002). Finally, Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001, 2003) introduce a similar interplay between monetary policy and the composition of
liabilities. However, when applied to the problem of consumers' underinsurance against the
risk of recessions, the main conclusions of those papers are fundamentally altered. Since in
this framework dollar instruments are issued by the domestic corporate sector, the insurance
capacity of these assets is limited. Moreover, the demand for insurance increases the vulner-
ability of the domestic corporate sector towards the real aggregate shock. In this model, a
highly countercyclical monetary policy reduces the insurance capacity of the available financial
instruments and decreases consumers' welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environment.
Section 3 solves the credit market equilibrium for a given anticipated devaluation response.
Different degrees of market imperfections are analyzed. Section 4 endogenizes the optimal
devaluation response and closes the model. Section 5 discusses the implications of an increase
in inflationary risk, the introduction of CPI-indexed credit contracts, and concludes by relaxing
the assumption that the domestic credit market is insulated from international capital flows.
Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Basic Framework
The model describes a small monetary economy subject to real aggregate risk, in this case, a
productivity shock. The economy is open to trade while the capital account is assumed to be
closed (this assumption is relaxed in section 5). This is to capture for the fact that in emerging
13
economies a large share of small firms and atomistic consumers do not have access to foreign
capital and are unable to diversify country risk.
There are three goods, a non-tradable final good, used for consumption and investment,
and two intermediates, one tradable and one non-tradable.
The economy is populated by consumers and a unit measure of entrepreneurs. Consumers
have risk averse preferences over date 2 consumption. They are endowed with 1/2 units of trad-
able and non-tradable intermediates. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral with no initial resources
and have access to a risky technology that requires a unit of investment. The productive project
is specific to the entrepreneur in the sense that its liquidation is socially costly.
There is an imperfect set of contracts. Credit contracts cannot be set contingent on the
realization of the aggregate shock. Instead, they can only be expressed in terms of a fixed
amount of foreign or domestic currency.
The paper analyzes whether this set of assets can adequately substitute for a complete set of
financial contracts under different degrees of market imperfection. This section formulates the
problem of a small open economy it terms of risk sharing between consumers and entrepreneurs
for the simplest case in which entrepreneurs are not protected by limited liability. In section 3,
more interesting risk sharing problems are analyzed.
The timing of events is as follows: Date 1 is a fully flexible period in which all contracts
are set. In the credit market, consumers and entrepreneurs choose the currency denomination
of contracts and the respective interest rates are set. In the goods market, the price of the
intermediate goods and the share of tradable and non-tradable inputs used in the production
of the final good are determined. Price of non-tradables is set in domestic currency, while price
of tradables is set in dollars. At date 2, the productivity shocks are realized. Firms repay their
debts and consumption takes place.
Transactions occur at date 1, when consumers sell their endowment, and at date 2 in the two
possible states of nature s E {B, G}. The vector of prices in this economy is
{pPT,pTB, pG,p , N ,p, p F ,p,p} where the superscript T denotes for tradable, N for non-
tradable intermediate goods, and F for the final good. I normalize the initial relative price of
tradables and non-tradables to one, pT = p N, and I use pN as a numeraire.
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2.2.1 Technology
Consumers are endowed with 1/2 units of tradable and non-tradable intermediate goods. En-
trepreneurs do not have initial resources. They have access to two production alternatives:
either they home-produce an amount K of the final good, or undertake a risky project. The
project requires an initial investment kl = 1, and results in date 2 joint output of tradable and
non-tradable goods: rAis units of tradables and (1 - -r) Ais units of non-tradables, where is
a fixed proportion r E (0, 1) . The technology is affected by an aggregate productivity shock z,
and a firm unobservable idiosyncratic sensitivity towards it, ai. The aggregate shock follows a
symmetric binomial distribution, z E -z, z} with Pr = 1/2, and the idiosyncratic shock is
uniformly distributed over the unitary interval, ai : U [0, 1].
T
= rAis and yi N = (1- r) Ais (2.1)
Ai - A (1 + aizs) (2.2)
The final good is produced by consumers using tradable and non-tradable intermediates.
At date 1, the optimal share of tradable and non-tradable inputs is chosen. At date 2, when
the state of nature is revealed, the structure of production is fixed. This assumption accounts
for the fact that the productive structure cannot adjust instantaneously to unexpected changes
in the relative price of inputs. On the other hand, the productive structure can optimally
accommodate to foreseen relative prices. Then, the technology is described by the following
production function:
F = min{, 1S7 } (2.3)
= arg max E y - PsY py s } (2.4)0<where is chos n at date 1, befothe t of nature is revealed.
where 7 is chosen at date 1, before the state of nature is revealed.
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2.2.2 Goods Market Structure
The goods market is in equilibrium if, for any state of nature s E {B, G}, the non-tradable
goods market clears, and the trade balance condition is satisfied:
yN = (1- r) Aisdi (2.5)
s = yS + yT = Adi (2.6)/0
The equilibrium conditions (2.5) and (2.6) require the amount of non-tradables used in the
production of the final good ((1 - q) yF) to be equal to the domestic production of tradable
intermediates ((1 - r) yF). And, from equation (2.4), the proportion of tradable inputs () is
interior only if prices are equal in expectation.
7 = (2.7)
E(pT) = E(p) (2.8)
Markets are assumed to be competitive in the sense that producing final goods results in
zero profits. The price of consumption goods is therefore equal to the marginal cost derived
from (2.3):
pF = pl + (1-a)pN (2.9)
2.2.3 Price Determination
Prices of intermediate goods are set at date 1. The price of non-tradables is set in domestic
currency while the price of tradable goods is set in dollars. Thus, in local currency denomination,
the price of tradables (pT) is equal to the nominal exchange rate. The devaluation rate is defined
as follows:
p -p i68- T
p1
The nominal devaluation schedule is assumed exogenous in the basic framework of the model
and endogenized in section 4. Importantly, in this context, expected devaluation has no real
implications. From (2.8), only deviations from the expected devaluation, which are necessarily
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symmetric, are going to impact on relative prices and consumption allocation. Then, I am
going to restrict the analysis to a devaluation schedule of the form
68 E {6,-6} (2.10)
6 is understood as the deviation from expected devaluation rate, that is, the devaluation re-
sponse to the aggregate shock.
Combining (2.8), (2.7), and (2.9), the goods market equilibrium is a vector
{pT1,pB,G,P1 PB,PG,P1 pF,p ,p,} such that for s E {B, G}:
pi = p=pi=l
PN = 1
pT = 1+6s
Fp = 1 +5
The domestic inflation rate is therefore positively correlated with the devaluation response,
through the proportion of tradable intermediates used in the production of the final good:
- = (2.11)
F (2.11)
2.2.4 The Risk Sharing Problem
2.2.4 The Risk Sharing Problem
The economic structure described above can be summarized in terms of risk sharing between
risk averse consumers and risk neutral entrepreneurs.
Consumers are endowed with 1/2 units of tradable and non-tradable intermediates. The
resulting unit of final good is sold to the entrepreneurs at the market price (pF). The credit
contracts can be denominated in domestic currency or dollars. Consumers diversify away firms'
idiosyncratic risk and the return on their assets only follows the realization of the aggregate
shock s E {B, G}. Then, consumers choose the optimal portfolio currency composition, subject
17
lc short selling constraint ( E [0, 1]), to maximize their expected utility:
max EU (c') (2.12)
s.t. pcC = p[ urp + (l-1) rdp]
where rp and rd are the interest rates for peso and dollar assets respectively and U is a risk
averse utility function with U > 0 and U" < 0. Using (2.7), (2.10), and (2.11), the budget
constraint can be rewritten as:
Cc = Rps + (1 - p) RP. (2.13)
where Rp, and Rd, are respectively the real return on peso and dollar assets in the s-state:6
f r-r 6 s=B
Rps = p - B (2.14)
rd+ r(1 s = G
Rds Td + (1 -) 6 s = B (2.15)
rd- (1 --r)6 s=G
Entrepreneurs choose whether to undertake the project. If they do, they borrow from
consumers to finance investment. Credit contracts can be denominated in pesos or dollars.
Each entrepreneur i E [0,1] chooses a strategy {ti, vi E {0, 1} x [0,1], where zi indicates
whether she undertakes the project and vi corresponds to the currency composition of debt.
max E(cis) (2.16)O~vi<1
tiE{O,1}
6 Real returns on assets are approximated, for interest rates close to one and devaluation and inflation rates
close to zero. using:
1lrp 1+._ rp-~ro
1+ , + 
1 + r.
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t = (Ai [pT + (1 - r) pN] - pF [virip + (1 - v,) rdp])
where rip and rid are respectively the interest rates for peso and dollar contracts, and Ai, is
defined in (2.2). Using (2.7), (2.10), and (2.11), the entrepreneur's budget constraint can be
rewritten as:
qc = i [Ais - viRip - (1 - vi) Rids] + (1 - i) K (2.17)
where Rips and Rids are respectively the real return on peso and dollar assets faced by the firm
i in the s-state:
( rip -h 7 = BRi.ps = {i - s=G (2.18)
rip +r z s = G
Rid = rid + (1 -) 6 = (2.19)
rid- (1 -r)6 s = G
Notice from equations (2.14)-(2.15) and (2.19)-(2.18), that the devaluation response to the
aggregate shock differentiates dollar and peso contracts. If devaluations happen in the B-state
-i.e. 6 > 0, dollar contracts involve larger payments in the negative realization of the shock.
From (2.11), inflation and devaluation are positively correlated, thus the real return on peso
assets is lower in the B-state. The contingent value of the assets is given by the size of the
devaluation response 6.
Finally, firms compete in the credit market and the zero profit condition holds: expected
entrepreneurs' profits are equal to their opportunity cost, that is, the home-production of K
units of final good. In equilibrium, the free entry condition (2.20) pins down the interest rate
so investors retain the expected net present value of production.
E (c) = K (2.20)
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2.3 Credit Market Equilibrium
This section characterizes the Credit Market Equilibrium under different degrees of market
imperfection. In particular, it analyzes whether the restricted set of credit contracts available,
namely dollar and peso denominated debt, suffices to attain the optimal allocation.
Initially, the first best equilibrium is presented for the simplest case in which entrepreneurs
are not protected by limited liability. Then, limited liability is introduced. The Second Best
allocation is used as a benchmark to analyze whether dollar and peso denominated contracts
can substitute for a perfect set of financial instruments. Ultimately, as a final departure from
the simplest specification, this section characterizes the Credit Market Equilibrium when firms
have non-exclusive contractual relationships.
The Credit Market Equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Credit Market Equilibrium) For a given devaluation schedule 68 E {(, -6},
with 6 > 0, a credit market equilibrium is a set
{(rip}) {rid} , {Vi}o, ,u} such that:
i) Vi E [0, 1]: vi maximizes (2.16) subject to (2.17), for (rip, rid}
ii) 1 maximizes (2.12) subject to (2.13), for a given {rp, rd}
iii) E (cis) = K
iv) = fi 0vo di
v) Vi E [0, 1]: rpi = rp and rdi = rd
2.3.1 Absence of Limited Liability
The basic framework without limited liability results in First Best allocation. That is, the
corporate sector bears the aggregate and the unobservable idiosyncratic risk and freely insures
consumers.
From (2.17), (2.18), and (2.19), entrepreneurs' expected consumption is linear in the cur-
rency composition of debt (vi). Then, firms are indifferent in the currency composition of debt
as long as the respective interest rates are equalized, rip = rid. Moreover, all firms are ex-ante
identical, so they all face the same interest rates, rip = rid = r, which is pinned down from the
.ee entry condition (2.20).
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The aggregate productivity shock indirectly affects consumers through the realization of the
devaluation response, 6, E {6, -6}, which determines the real return on assets in (2.14) and
(2.15). The optimal portfolio composition is A = 1 - r. From (2.13), at p = 1 - r consumers
avoid the currency risk by holding a portfolio that replicates the share of tradables and non-
tradables in the consumption price index.7 Consumption in each state of nature s E {B, G} is
simply given by the fixed real payment r.
Finally, the size of the devaluation response is irrelevant in this case.
2.3.2 Limited Liability and Exclusive Credit Contracts
In this subsection I analyze the existence of limited liability. The technology is assumed specific
to the entrepreneur and its liquidation is socially costly. For simplicity, I assume that, in the
case of default, the firm makes zero profits and consumers get no liquidation value.8 Before,
the aggregate shock indirectly affected consumers through the realization of the devaluation
response, now they are also affected through the risk of default on credit contracts.
I make parametric restrictions to assure that defaults only happen in the B-state -i.e.
2K > Az > K. The Second Best with limited liability replicates the following program:
max U (c ) + U (cG)RSB
s.t.
C= Pr (AiB > RB) RSB
ftSBCG R6
2K = Pr (AiB > RSB) E (AiB - RBIAiB > R B) + E (AiG - RSB)
A- SBPr (AiB > RsB) = aSB = A
Az
where RSB and RB denote for consumers' claims on the corporate sector in the B-state and the
G-state respectively. The solution to this program is independent of the exchange rate volatility,
7 The same optimal portfolio choice arises in an economy where the default risk is independent of the currency
risk. See Ize and Levy Yeyati (1998, 2003) for a model of asset substitution in these lines.
8 This assumption can be interpreted as a reduced form of a model with specificity in production in which the
entrepreneur can "divert" the project returns. See Hart and More (1998).
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6, as can be seen in the first order condition characterizing the Second Best allocation:
foc (RB) = [U' (c) - U' (cG)] aSB - (Ct) B = 0 (2.21)
The first term in (2.21) corresponds to the marginal benefit of improving insurance, while the
second term is its cost in terms of default risk. Improving smoothness requires greater payments
from the corporate sector to consumers in the adverse realization, precisely when firms' revenues
are lower. Thus, it increases the probability of default. Indeed, even though entrepreneurs are
risk neutral and the credit market is competitive, insurance is costly. Since the corporate sector
is protected by limited liability, it does not redistribute consumers' resources from the G-state to
the B-state in actuarially fair basis. Instead, because a positive number of firms defaults in the
B-state, for every unit of G-goods surrendered by the consumers, only a fraction is transformed
into B-consumption. From (2.21), the cost of insurance increases in RB. Therefore, there
is an optimal trade off between smoothness and maximization of consumption. The optimal
allocation is always interior: neither perfect smoothness nor maximum expected consumption
are optimal.
Can an economy with only dollar and peso denominated contracts reach the Second Best
allocation?
The corporate sector's default risk is a function of the currency composition of debt. From
(2.17), firm i decides to stay active and repay its debts in the B-state if its sensitivity towards
the shock is smaller than the threshold value aB (vi):
A - iRipB - (1 - vi) RidB (2.22)
ai I as (vi) (2.22)Az
Dollarization increases the vulnerability of firms. That is, since dollar contracts involve
larger payments in the bad state (and the opposite occurs for peso contracts), the default risk
of a firm increases in the share of dollar denominated debt.
If firms have exclusive contractual relationships, investors can set debt contracts according
to the firm's default risk. That is, the interest rate faced by each firm depends on its currency
composition of debt. In this case, entrepreneurs are induced to hold a composition of debt
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-i.e. a default risk- that is in line with consumers' preferences. All firms are ex-ante identical,
therefore, the composition of debt is equal to the consumers' portfolio choice, Vi E [0, 1] : vi = it.
The decentralized equilibrium with dollar and peso assets replicates the following program:
max U () + U (cG)
RB
s.t.
C' = RB Pr (AiB > RB)
c = RG
2K = Pr (AiB > RB) E (AiB - RBIAiB > RB) + E (AiG - RG)
Pr (AiB > RB) = aB = A-Az
RB < RdB (vi = 0, 6)
R RpB (i = 1,6)
RpB (vi = 1, 6) and RdB (vi = 0, 6) are specified in (2.14) and (2.15), and satisfy the free entry
condition (2.20) for vi = 1 and vi = 0 respectively. Since RpB (vi = 1, 6) RdB (vi = 0, 6), the
two constraints cannot be binding simultaneously.
The only difference between this program and the one characterizing the Second Best equi-
librium results from the existence of short selling constraints. That is, consumers' real claims in
the B-state can never be greater than the payments stipulated for dollar debt (RdB (vi = 0, 6)).
Similarly, consumers cannot reduce their claims below the payments specified in a fully peso
denominated contract (RPB (vi = 1, 6)). The Second Best allocation is therefore attained when
these constraints are not binding.
When the set of instruments is restricted to dollar and peso assets, the optimal allocation
is characterized by the following first order condition:
fOC(RBI6) : [U' (cB) - U(Cc)] a -U (c) Az =Ad- Ax (2.23)
Ad > : Ad [RB-RdB (vi = 0,6)] = 
A, >O : Ap[RB - RB (vi = 1, 6)] = O
where Ad is the multiplier for the upper bound of RB, and Ap for its lower bound. Whenever
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the upper bound restriction binds (d > 0), consumers are constrained in their demand for
insurance. And, conversely, if they are constrained in their demand for peso assets (Ap > 0),
the level of insurance is above the Second Best optimum.
Notice that the short selling constraint can only be binding for low devaluation response.
Augmenting the exchange rate volatility increases the contingent value of assets. Therefore,
there is always a sufficiently large devaluation response (which I denote SB) such that the
equilibrium is interior and the Second Best allocation is attained. Combining (2.14), (2.15), and
(2.20), RB (vi = 1, 6) and RdB (vi = 0, ) are uniquely determined by the devaluation response
and satisfy:
(EPB _ 27 <0r AP 06 l-aBl <.0
5 1 - aB 1 5-(96
aRdB 2 (1 - r) > 0 < 0
6 1 - aBO 9 -
where aBl and aBO correspond to the probabilities of default, defined in (2.22), for vi = 1 and
vi = 0 respectively. The multipliers on the financial restrictions decrease in the exchange rate
volatility. In this sense, monetary policy is understood as a tool for improving the efficiency of
the credit market.
I am going to restrict the analysis to the case in which, for low devaluation response,
consumers are constrained in their demand for insurance: Ad ( = 0) > 0. That occurs if
r < RB, where r = rd ( = 0) = rp (6 = 0) satisfies the free entry condition (2.20). Then, for
low devaluation response, the credit market is fully dollarized and consumers are underinsured
(see figure 2-2.a). In this case the equilibrium interest rate is pinned down from the free entry
condition (2.20) for vi = 0.
In the interior solution ( > ASB), the first order condition (2.23) is identical to the one
characterizing the Second Best allocation (2.21). Dollar and peso assets can replicate the opti-
mal contingent contract {(RB, RSGB }. The decentralized solution for this program is implicitly
given by E (0, 1) such that:
A (rp- rS) + (1 -z) (rd + (1 - ) ) = RSB (2.24)
24
14-
uwc
-S_ 6
a. Optimal Portfolio Composition b. Consumers' Expected Utility
Figure 2-2: Exclusive Credit Contracts
The Second Best allocation is invariant to the size of the devaluation response. That implies
that consumers' portfolio composition adjusts to changes in the devaluation response so to keep
real claims on the corporate sector constant. Correspondingly, the default risk on peso and
dollar assets is identical and independent of the exchange rate volatility.
The equilibrium interest rates satisfy the free entry condition (2.20) for vi = , and, at the
margin, leave the consumers indifferent in their currency portfolio composition:
rp- rd = 06 > 0 (2.25)
U c )aB-U'(a
where 0 = u,(c )aB+u(cg is a positive constant derived from the consumers' first order condi-
tion. 9
For 6 > SB the share of peso denominated assets increases in the devaluation response. °0
Combining (2.24), (2.25), and (2.20), the portfolio composition that achieves the Second Best
allocation is characterized by:
= (1 - a-/) > 0
90 is derived from the consumers' first order condition, recognizing that in the interior optimum ( E (0, 1))
the Second Best allocation is attained. Therefore, the optimal allocation is invariant to the devaluation response
a = O) and a is constant.
"lThe opposite occurs if r > R s B. For low 6, consumers are constrained in their demand for peso contracts:
A, (6 = 0) > 0. Then, A (6 = 0) = 1 and 8a6) < 0 for 6 > 6 SB In this case, consumers have too much insurance
and too little expected consumption for low values of 6.
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(c G)aB+U'(cc
where--- U'()(1+aB) is a positive constant.
Notice that lim _,t = 1 - r (see figure 2-2.a). The portfolio p = 1 - r is neutral in the
sense that real claims are not affected by the exchange rate response. When the contingent
value of assets is very large, an infinitesimal deviation from this neutral portfolio suffices to
achieve the optimal trade-off between insurance and maximization of consumption.
Consumers' expected utility is plotted in figure 2-2.b. The Second Best allocation is inde-
pendent of the devaluation response 6, but can only be achieved for sufficient contingent value
of assets.
The following proposition summarizes these findings:
Proposition 1 (Exclusive Contracts) For a set of parameters {A, z, r, K} and a given de-
valuation schedule Js E {6,-6}, with 6 > 0, the credit market equilibrium is characterized
by:
i) Vi E [0, 1]: i = 
ii) lima- () = 1 -r
If, evaluated at 6 = O, [U' (cc) - U' (ca)] aB - U' (ct) > 0. Then:
iii) V6 < 6 SB: (6) = 0
iv) V6 > IB ' > 0
where SB : Ad (aSB) = 0 and 6 < SB : Ad (6) > 0
2.3.3 Limited Liability and Non-Exclusive Credit Contracts
When the corporate sector is protected by limited liability, the default risk depends on the
currency composition of debt. Exclusive credit contracts can stipulate the composition of
debt in line with the investor's preferences. However, if firms have non-exclusive contractual
relationships and the terms of these contracts are not contractible, it is impossible for a single
investor to enforce a certain currency composition of debt.11 This is the natural environment
to analyze the problem of domestic dollarization since atomistic lenders can hardly impose
exclusive contracts on firms. Then, entrepreneurs cannot commit to maintain the composition
lSee Bisin and Guaitoli (2002) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) for models of moral hazard with multiple
contractual relationships.
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of liabilities agreed with the original investors. Instead, they have incentives to pursue an unduly
currency risk relative to the consumers' preferences. I this case, the probability of bankruptcy
of firms with dollar liabilities increases in the exchange rate volatility.l2 Dollar contracts inherit
the firms' default risk and their ability to provide insurance is jeopardized. As before, the size
of the devaluation response determines the contingency value of assets, now also the magnitude
of dollar assets' default risk.
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs choose the currency composition of debt vi E [0, 1] to maximize expected
consumption:
max E (ci.) -r (ciB > O) E (CeBIlcB > ) + E (ci)
o<vil
s.t.
E (eBI cB > 0) = A (1 - 1/2ag (vi) z) - viRipB - (1 - Vi) RidB
E (crG) = A (1 + 1/2z) - viRipB - (1 -Vi) RidG
Default is assumed to occur only in the B-state, in which case the probability of remaining
active is a function of the composition of debt, Pr (cieB > 0) = aB (vi), defined in (2.22).13
At date 1, when credit contracts are set, firms only differ in their chosen composition of
debt. However, firms cannot commit to maintain the specified share of dollar debt, thus credit
contracts cannot be set as a function of vi. As a result, Rips and Rids are not firm specific and
entrepreneurs face a convex objective function:
ovE(2 Az [(rd- p + )2 + (r- - )2]>
Entrepreneurs have incentives to incur undue currency risk relative to consumers' preferences.
Firms hold extreme composition of liabilities, either entirely denominated in pesos (vi = 1) or
12 See Galiani et al. (2003), Bleakley and Cowan (2002), Martinez and Werner (2002), and Aguiar (2002) for
different estimations of currency mismatches in the Latin American corporate sector.
13 The same parametric restriction imposed in the previous subsection assures that default only happens in the
B-state for all relevant values of 6: K < Az < 2K
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dollars (vi = 0).14
Because firms with only peso debt have lower financial obligations in the B-state, they are
less exposed to the aggregate shock than dollarized firms. From (2.22), the vulnerability gap
heightens in the exchange rate volatility.
The equilibrium interest rate is the one that induces the corporate sector to issue debt
according to consumers' demand for dollar and peso assets. As long as consumers diversify
their portfolio composition, firms with dollar and peso debt must coexist. Thus, the equilib-
rium interest rate is the one that leaves firms indifferent between the two extremes of debt
composition:
E(cIvi = 1, rp) = E(civi = O, rd) (2.26)
and the free entry condition (2.20) is satisfied.
The peso interest rate is always lower than dollar interest rate. Since peso denominated
contracts involve greater claims in the state with higher probability of repayment, entrepreneurs
are only willing to accept them at a lower interest rate. The opposite occurs with dollar
denominated contracts.
rP - -aB < 0 (2.27)
rd 1 -aB
=96 (1 )1 + aBO
where aBl and ao are the probabilities of remaining active for firms with vi = 1 and vi = 0
respectively.
Summing up, entrepreneurs do not diversify the currency composition of debt. Firms with
different currency composition of debt can coexist as long as the indifference condition (2.26)
is satisfied, in which case, the proportions of each type of firm are determined by the demand
side.
Credit Market Equilibrium
Consumers choose the portfolio composition p E [0, 1] to maximize their expected utility
'
4Chamon (2001) and Broda and Levy-Yeyati (2003) also find that currency-blind credit contracts incentive
entrepreneurs (or banks) to excessive currency risk.
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(2.12) subject to their budget constraint. Entrepreneurs are protected by limited liability so
the return on assets inherits their default risk. Moreover, because the vulnerability of dollar-
ized firms and those with only peso liabilities are different, so are the probabilities of default
associated with the respective credit contracts. Consumers diversify away the idiosyncratic risk
and the law of large numbers holds. Hence, the proportion of performing peso denominated
contracts (resp. dollar) is equal to the probability that firms with only peso debt (resp. dollar)
remain active.
In the presence of non-exclusive contractual relationships, firms cannot commit to a certain
currency composition of debt. Therefore, the interest rates faced by each firm cannot be set
as a function of the currency composition of debt. Instead, they are determined by the free
entry condition (2.20) for vi = 0 and vi = 1 respectively. Moreover, consumers cannot have
long positions of dollar or peso assets. Then, the credit market equilibrium is characterized by
the following program:
max U (C) + U (cG)
s.t.
CB = RpB Pr (AiB > RpB) + (1 - ) RdB Pr (AiB > RdB)
CG = LRpG + (1 - ) RdG
2K = Pr (AiB > RB) E(AiB - RpBIAiB > RpB) + E (AiG - RpG)
2K = Pr (AiB > RdB) E (AiB - RdBIAiB > RdB) + E (AiG - RdG)
i< 1
I> 0
where Pr (AiB > RpB) = aBl and Pr (AiB > RdB) = aso-
The credit market currency composition is given the first order condition:
foc( 16) : U' (c)[aBRB - aBORdB] + U' (c)[R - RdG]= -Ad + 
Ad > : Ad = 
Ap>o: Ap(1-:)=0
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·ghere Ad and Ap are the multipliers for the lower and the upper bound of p respectively.
As it was explained above, firms choose not to diversify the composition of liabilities. Then,
default probabilities of dollar and peso assets are different. From (2.22), the default risk on
dollar assets increases in the exchange rate volatility, while the probability of default of peso
assets declines in 6. In the presence of non-exclusive contractual relationships, the size of the
devaluation response not only affects the contingency value of assets, but also the default risk
on dollar and peso contracts.
In the limit when 6 = 0, the optimal portfolio coincides with the equilibrium described in
the previous subsection, that is, consumers are constrained in their demand for dollar assets
(Ad > 0). Indeed, in the limit when 6 = 0, the first order condition coincides with (2.23):
T
lim foc (Ip6) = - [U' (c) - U' (c)] aB + U' (c) A- < 0 (2.28)
where r = rd (6 = 0) = rp (6 = 0) satisfies the free entry condition (2.20) and aB = aBl (6 = 0) =
aB (6 = 0).
For low devaluation response, the credit market equilibrium is identical to the one under
exclusive contracts. The intuition is simple, for 6 < ASB (SB is defined in proposition 1),
consumers are constrained in their demand for dollar assets. In both cases, the credit market
is fully dollarized ( = 0) and the interest rate is given by the free entry condition (2.20) for
vi = 0. It follows that the probability of default for dollar assets in both cases is also equal.
However, for 6 > 6SB, the optimal allocation requires diversified composition of liabilities.
'When firms have non-exclusive contractual relationships, they choose extreme currency compo-
sition. Therefore, the default risk on dollar assets is excessive relative to consumers' preferences:
aBO < aSB, where aSB corresponds to the probability of default in the Second Best optimum.
This reduces the ability of dollar assets to insure against the aggregate shock. Consumers
demand larger quantity of such assets to attain the required level of insurance. Hence, the
credit market remains entirely dollarized for higher devaluation response relative to the case
with exclusive contracts: V6 E [0, _E]: ·  (6) = 0, where AE > ASB. These results are plotted in
figure 2-3.a.
The fact that entrepreneurs cannot commit to diversify the currency composition of debt
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Figure 2-3: Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Contractual Relationships
is inefficient. Entrepreneurs' expected utility is always given by the free entry condition, irre-
spectively of the contractual arrangement. However, consumers are worse off in this scenario.
Indeed, because the default on dollar assets is above optimum, consumers are underinsured
against the aggregate shock.
The magnitude of this inefficiency increases in the size of the devaluation response, following
the risk of default of dollar assets. In fact, when 6 is sufficiently large, the default risk on dollar
assets is so significant that they fail to insure against the aggregate shock. Consequently, there
is a large enough exchange rate volatility (which I denote 6 E), such that the optimal portfolio
is entirely composed of peso assets (Ap > 0). See figure 2-3.a.
In contrast to the case with exclusive contracts, here the magnitude of the devaluation
response always has real effects. Figure 2-3.b plots the impact of 6 on consumers' expected
utility. For < SB the contingent value of dollar assets is insufficient to replicate the Second
Best contract and consumers are underinsured. Thus, consumers' welfare increases in the
devaluation response. For 6 > ASB the equilibrium with non-exclusive credit contracts departs
from the Second Best allocation because dollar assets have reduced insurance capacity. The
default risk on dollar assets increases in the volatility of the exchange rate and, consequently,
consumers' welfare declines in the size of the devaluation response.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 2 (Non-Exclusive Contracts) For a set of parameters
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l
{A, z,r,K} and a given devaluation schedule A E {6,-6}, with > 0, the credit market
equilibrium is characterized by:
i) {vi}=o = 1 and 0vi1tl =
If, evaluated at 6 = 0, [U' (C) - U' (cG)] aB - U' (c~) > 0. Then'
ii) 6 < a _ ()- 0
where aE: Ad (E) = 0 and < AE: Ad (6) > 0
iii) V6 > E : (6) = 1
where E : Ap E) = O and > E : Ap () > 
2.3.4 Discussion
In the last decade many economies succeeded in controlling inflationary risk. The process of
stabilization often involved imposing limitations on the monetary authority's discretion, either
because the exchange rate was used as an anchor for prices in the process of disinflation, or
because the monetary authority's misconduct and lack of credibility were the main sources of
inflationary risk. Therefore, the reduction in monetary policy discretion and inflationary risk
were often simultaneous.
The current concern in these economies is not so much with inflationary risk, but with
their vulnerability with respect to aggregate shocks -namely sudden stops, changes in the
international price of commodities, international interest rates, etc. And, correspondingly, the
main factor behind the volatility of consumption is the risk of recessions.
If, as suggested here, insurance against the risk of recession is the motive behind the demand
for foreign currency denominated assets, the lack of response of the monetary policy towards
the aggregate shock exacerbates the dollarization of the economy. In other words, in economies
characterized by their underinsurance against aggregate shocks, we would expect high levels of
dollarization to coexist with low volatility of nominal variables.
Moreover, because firms have non-exclusive credit contracts, the currency composition of
debt is not contractible. Entrepreneurs pursue an unduly risky currency strategy. In this case,
dollarized firms are too exposed to exchange rate volatility.
The natural question that arises from this discussion is related to the role of the monetary
i_:hority. indeed, the devaluation response is the key variable dictating the ability of dollar
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and peso assets to replicate a complete set of financial instruments. The next section analyzes
the optimal devaluation policy in the context of a credit market with non-exclusive contractual
relationships.
2.4 Policy Equilibrium
When firms have non-exclusive contractual relationships they cannot commit to diversify the
currency composition of their liabilities. In this case, the size of the devaluation response to
aggregate shocks always has real effects. For low exchange rate volatility, dollar assets have
insufficient contingent value and the optimal trade-off between insurance and maximization of
consumption cannot be achieved. On the other hand, a large devaluation response results in
excessive default risk on dollar assets. Then, the ability of dollar denominated contracts to
insure against the aggregate shock is jeopardized and consumers end up underinsured.
A committed and credible Central Bank that maximizes consumers' welfare can still push
the economy towards the Second Best equilibrium. The optimal monetary policy under full
commitment results from maximizing consumers' expected utility before the credit contracts
are set. Then, the Central Bank chooses 6 internalizing its impact on the currency composition
of contracts and the equilibrium interest rates:
max EU (cc)
s.t.
Cc = pIaBRpB + (1 -)aBORdB
c = ARG + (1 - ) Rd
K = E(cislvi= 1,rp)
K = E(c'Ivi = o, rd)
where Rps and Rds are the real claims on dollar and peso denominated contracts given by
equations (2.14) and (2.15). And aB1 and aoB are the probabilities of default on peso and
dollar assets.
Under full commitment, the Central Bank can push the economy towards the Second Best
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.- ):ailibrium. If it announces = -sB, the credit market equilibrium is characterized by full
lollarization: Vi E [0, 1]: vi = = 0. At IL = 0 and = ASB, the Second Best allocation is
achieved and consumers reach the optimal trade-off between smoothness and maximization of
consumption.
However, a time-inconsistent monetary authority will not implement this ex-ante optimal
devaluation response. In what follows, I assume that the exchange rate intervention occurs
after the credit contracts have been set. Taking the portfolio currency composition and the
market interest rates as given, the Central Bank chooses a devaluation response that maximizes
consumers' expected utility. Then, the Central Bank will not follow the promised devaluation
response 6 = SB. The Second Best allocation will not be attained as the ex-ante optimal
devaluation response is time inconsistent.
The mechanism presented here is in line with the common agency problem developed in
Tirole (2003). Government is a common agent of all consumers, and its incentives depend on a
representative local investor's portfolio, but not on a single investor's choice. Then, consumers
exert externalities on each other through their impact on the Central Bank's incentives.
Definition 2 (Policy Equilibrium) The Policy (subgame perfect) Equilibrium is a set
{rd, rp, p, {vi}i=0 , 6 such that:
i) {rd, rp,, , {vi}i=O is a Domestic Credit Market Equilibrium with non-exclusive contracts
given a devaluation schedule 6 E {6, -6}.
ii) The devaluation schedule 6, E {6, -6}, with 6 > 0, nmaximizes consumers' utility (2.12)
3ubject to their budget constraint, for a given Domestic Credit Market Equilibrium with non-
exclusive contracts {rd, rp, L, i}iO}
2.4.1 Optimal Policy
assume that the Central Bank follows an inflation targeting rule. That is, the Central Bank
.s committed to a certain expected inflation. Instead, it chooses a devaluation response to
the aggregate shock. As it was explained in section 2, devaluation bias does not affect the
:esults presented here but only deviations from expectations. For that reason, I am restricting
the analysis to devaluation responses of the form E {6, -6}. Moreover, I assume that the
Central Bank is constrained to nonnegative devaluation response if the adverse realization of
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the shock occurs -i.e. > 0. This is a reduced form of a model where devaluation has,
additionally, an expansionary effect on the economy. In the appendix I extend the model to
include a devaluation expansionary effect that endogenizes the lower bound for the optimal
devaluation in the B-state.
The monetary authority intervenes in the exchange rate market after credit contracts have
already been set. Given a credit market equilibrium
{rp, rd, , {Vi}=o} the Central Bank chooses 6 > 0 to maximize consumers' expected util-
ity:
max EU (cs)
8>0
s.t.
CC = AaBlRpB + (1 - ) aBORdB
c = IRp + (1 - ) Rd
where Rps and Rd are the real return on dollar and peso denominated assets, given by equations
(2.14) and (2.15). The probabilities of default for peso and dollar assets, aBl and aBo, are given
by (2.22) for vi = 1 and vi = 0 respectively.
Devaluation is used to redistribute resources between the corporate sector and consumers
across different states of nature. If credit contracts are mainly denominated in pesos, an increase
in the devaluation response redistributes -through its effect on the inflation rate- consumers'
resources from the B-state to the G-state. This makes consumption schedule more uneven, but
increases expected consumption as reduces the corporate sector's default risk. Devaluation has
the opposite effect on the schedule of payments of dollar denominated contracts.
Because at the time of the intervention credit contracts have already been set, the deval-
uation response does not alter the credit market currency composition or the interest rates.
However, the Central Bank's optimal policy feeds back into borrowers' and lenders' ex-ante
devaluation expectation. This, in turn, determines the currency denomination of contracts
and the market interest rates for peso and dollar debt in (2.27). As a result, from an ex-ante
perspective, the Central Bank's optimal devaluation response is biased against insurance.
The Central Bank's bias can be seen in the first order condition, evaluated at = 0. The
35
first term corresponds to the marginal benefit of improving insurance while the second term
is its cost in terms of expected consumption. Indeed, the Central Bank's first order condition
departures from the consumers' (equation (2.28)) in its undervaluation of smoothness.
foc(6 = o1 ) = [U(c)aB - U()] - U' (Cc) (2.29)
where r = rd (6 = 0) = rp (6 = 0) and aB = aBl (6 = 0) = aBO (6 = 0).
If (2.29) is positive, the policy intervention improves consumers' insurance. However, given
the Central Bank's excessive incentive to reduce the number of defaulting firms, the magnitude
of the response is insufficient to reach the Second Best allocation. If the market is heavily
dollarized, the Central Bank's interior optimum is achieved by increasing the devaluation re-
sponse, which improves the contingency of dollar assets against the aggregate risk. Improving
insurance is not possible when credit contracts are mainly denominated in pesos because the
Central Bank is constrained to nonnegative devaluations in the B-state. In this case, the best
the monetary authority can do is to minimize the exchange rate volatility and preserve the real
value of peso claims.
On the other hand, if (2.29) is negative, the optimal monetary policy lowers the number
of defaulting firms. That is, monetary intervention reduces consumers' insurance. Then, the
exchange rate volatility is minimized when the credit market is heavily dollarized, in order to
avoid the negative effect on firms' balance sheet.l5 The Central Bank's interior optimum is
attained if credit contracts are mainly denominated in the domestic currency.16 That is, a
countercyclical monetary policy diminishes peso claims in the B-state. This reduces the default
risk, at the expense of lower insurance.
Proposition 3 For a set of parameters A, z, r, K} and a given Credit Market Equilibrium
{rd, rp, A, {vi}=_-o , the optimal devaluation schedule of the form 6, E {6, -6}, with 6 > 0,
satisfies:
'
5 For 1. < , increasing expected consumption would require a revaluation in the B-state. This possibility was
ruled out by assumption. The appendix presents an extension with nominal rigidities in which devaluation has
an expansive effect on output and the impossibility of revaluation in the B-state arises endogenously.
lQualitatively the same results arise if the Central Bank seeks to minimize the gap between output and an
ideal target. The optimal policy is not to float the exchange rate if the corporate sector is heavily dollarized,
and the monetary policy is very countercyclical if credit contracts are denominated in pesos.
36
If (2.29) is positive:
i) Vl < :a ( ti ) > O and - <0
ii) Vp > : 6 (t) = 0
where E (0,1 - r) satisfies foc (d = 01) = 0
If (2.29) is negative:
i) Vt < 71: () = O
ii) ¥V > 71: (t') > 0 and °1> 0
where 7 e (1 - r, 1) satisfies foc(6 = 0, i) = 0.
Proof. Follows from differentiating foc (6l{/) = 0, recognizing that, in the interior CB's
acc ac
optimum, consumption in the two states are independent of · : p_ = = 0. ·
2.4.2 Policy Equilibrium
At the time of the monetary intervention, credit contracts have already been set. Then, the
degree of dollarization and the market interest rates determine the Central Bank's optimal
policy. The ex-post optimal policy feeds back into the credit market expectations and maps
into a credit market equilibrium. In the lines of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983), the policy equilibrium is the set of fixed points for which the market foreseen
devaluation response coincides with the ex-post Central Bank's optimum:
* (IL ('e), r (6e) , rd (6e), {vi (6)}=0) =6
where de corresponds to the market expectations and 6* is the optimal Central Bank devaluation
response. The fixed points correspond to the time consistent Central Bank's policies.
Because at the time of the intervention, the credit contracts have already been set, the
Central Bank's incentives are distorted against smoothness of consumption. The quality of the
distortion depends on the sign of equation (2.29) and will determine characteristics of the policy
equilibrium set.
If (2.29) is positive, the Central Bank improves consumption smoothness by increasing the
contingent value of dollar assets. However, because of its bias against insurance, the exchange
rate intervention is insufficient to achieve the Second Best allocation. In this case, there is
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Figure 2-4: Unique Policy Equilibrium
a unique equilibrium characterized by full dollarization of the credit market and positive but
suboptimal devaluation response.
Combining propositions 2 and 3, monetary policy reduces the devaluation response in the
share of peso denominated contracts and, correspondingly, the credit market becomes more
dollarized as the exchange rate volatility decreases. Therefore, the only stable equilibrium
involves full dollarization. In that case, because of the Central Bank's lack of commitment, the
devaluation response is always suboptimal, that is, 6* < .B (see figure 2-4).
More interesting is the case in which (2.29) is negative. In this case, the Central Bank pushes
the economy towards a reduction of insurance. A complementarity arises between the credit
market currency composition, described in proposition 2, and the optimal monetary policy,
characterized by proposition 3.
When the credit market is mainly composed of peso assets ( > 7 in proposition 3), the
Central Bank chooses an excessive devaluation response relative to the optimum under full
commitment -under full commitment the monetary authority would internalize the negative
affect of 6 on the equilibrium peso interest rate in (2.27). As a result, consumers exacerbate
their preference towards peso denominated contracts. From proposition 2, because dollarized
firms cannot bear large exchange rate volatility, the default risk on dollar assets is excessive.
The market's reaction is to increase the share of peso denominated assets, reinforcing the motive
for a countercyclical monetary policy.
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a. Multiple Policy Equilibria b. Consumers' Expected Utility
Figure 2-5: Multiple Policy Equilibria
Correspondingly, when the credit market is heavily dollarized ( < in proposition 3), the
Central Bank minimizes the exchange rate volatility, departing from the optimal policy under
full commitment -a committed monetary authority would internalize the positive effect of 6 on
the equilibrium interest rate on dollar debt in (2.27). From proposition 2, the credit market
intensifies its degree of dollarization when the devaluation response is low, which exacerbates
the monetary lack of response.
As a consequence, there are potentially two stable equilibria: one with low dollarization
and excessive exchange rate volatility and another with full dollarization and no devaluation
response (see figure 2-5.a).
Consumers are underinsured in both equilibria. However, if the economy is fully dollarized,
the Central Bank is constrained in its attempt to further reduce smoothness. On the other
hand, when credit contracts are mainly denominated in pesos, the monetary authority succeeds
in implementing its unconstrained optimum. That is, the monetary intervention reduces con-
sumers' insurance. In this equilibrium, dollar assets have excessive default risk in the B-state
and therefore fail to provide insurance. Moreover, since monetary policy is highly countercycli-
caI, the return on peso assets in the two states is extremely uneven. As a result, consumers are
unambiguously better off in the equilibrium with full dollarization (see figure 2-5.b).
These findings are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 4 For a set of parameters {A, z, r, K}, the Policy Equilibrium satisfies:
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If, evaluated at = , U'( [aB- ~] > 1, there is a unique ?olicy Equilibrium that
satisfies:
i) V i E [0,1]: vi = = 0
ii) 6 E (O,SB)
If, evaluated at 6 = O, a < U -) [aB -] < 1, there are potentially two stable Policy
Equilibria:
i) Full dollarization equilibrium:
Vi E [0,1] : vi = =
= 
ii) Low dollarization equilibrium:
Vi E [0, 1]: {} = , 0 = 0, i E (1 - , 1]
62 > E
iii) Full dollarization equilibrium always exists
2.4.3 Discussion
When insurance against the risk of recession is the motive behind dollarization, consumers are
better off under full dollarization than with high share of peso denominated contracts. The
intuition is simple: if consumers hold peso denominated assets, the monetary authority can
pursue a countercyclical policy. The monetary authority has incentives to reduce the number
of defaulting firms below the ex-ante consumers' optimum. Hence, the optimal policy increases
the volatility of the return on savings. On the other hand, in the full dollar equilibrium, real
value of savings is preserved during recessions, when investors value them the most.
An important caveat must be made. In an attempt to emphasize the interplay between credit
market currency composition and the optimal monetary policy, the framework was simplified to
only include agents participating in the domestic financial market. However, concerns regarding
dollarization arise from its consequences in terms of output volatility.
In the model presented here, the equilibrium with low dollarization enables the Central
Bank to pursue a countercyclical policy, which reduces the impact of aggregate shocks on
:utput. Conversely, in the full dollarization equilibrium, output volatility attains its maximum.
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In this case, monetary policy is incapable of reducing the number of defaulting firms.17
Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are many welfare losses associated with
output volatility, especially related to employment and investment. Not surprisingly, the current
debate in many of these countries is centered on the "de-dollarization" dilemma.l8 This model,
by explaining the reasons underlying the dollarization of domestic credit contracts, offers some
insights to this debate:
1. If, as emphasized here, an insurance motive generates demand for dollar assets, the cou-
pling of low inflationary risk with a large share of dollar liabilities is not surprising. The
interplay between the currency denomination of contracts and the optimal devaluation
response can explain the persistence in the share of dollar denominated debt.
2. Entrepreneurs have incentives to incur undue currency risk. As long as firms have non-
exclusive credit relationships, they cannot commit to diversify the composition of lia-
bilities. Non contractibility of currency denomination of debts underlies the excessive
vulnerability of dollarized firms to exchange rate volatility. Moreover, it reduces the
ability of dollar assets to hedge against the risk of recession and exacerbates consumers'
underinsurance.
3. Monetary policy functions both as an ex-ante incentive device and as an ex-post redistribu-
tive tool between consumers and entrepreneurs. The juxtaposition of functions causes the
monetary policy's time inconsistency. Although the promise of a countercyclical monetary
policy might induce a less dollarized credit market, it is not credible. Once the market is
dollarized, the Central Bank will find it optimal to reduce the volatility of the exchange
rate.l 9 The goal is then to separate these two functions, incorporating in the debate on
"de-dollarization" either fiscal considerations aimed to include a different redistributive
tool, or corrective distortions in the return on assets so lenders and borrowers internalize
the effects of their currency choice.
'7If the Central Bank's objective function is in terms of the output gap instead of consumers' utility, the policy
equilibrium is qualitatively equivalent to the one characterized in proposition 4, for U'nr) [a - ] E (aB, 1) 
'sSee the Conference on "Financial Dedollarization: Policy Options" Washington: InterAmerican Development
Bank, 2003.
19 See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002) for a model in which a countercyclical monetary policy also functions
as an ex-ante incentive device and presents similar time inconsistency problems.
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2.5 Robustness of the full dollar equilibrium
2.5.1 Persistence in the share of dollar liabilities
The model presented here explains why the share of dollar denominated credit contracts remains
high in economies that succeeded in controlling inflation. Moreover, in the context of this
framework, it can also be explained why many of these heavily dollarized economies often have
a history of important inflationary episodes.
The easiest way to analyze the implications of changes in the inflationary risk is by intro-
ducing a mean preserving spread over the inflation rate in (2.11). To focus on pure monetary
disturbances, I assume that the relative price of tradables and non-tradables is not affected by
the inflationary risk:20
1r = T6 + 
6s-r, = (1-r) 6,
: N (0,a2)
Inflationary risk does not affect real returns on dollar assets. They are still given by the
real claims on contracts (2.15) and the probability of repayment in the B-state aBo, defined in
(2.22) for vi = 0. On the other hand, inflationary risk has an impact on real return on peso
assets. Both real claims on contracts and their default risk are affected:
fr-r6-E s=B
Rps = ( rv - s=- (2.30)
rp+rJ6-e s=G
Pr (AiB > RpB)= aB1 = A- (2.31)Az
A mean preserving spread over inflation increases the demand for dollar denominated assets
for any given devaluation response. Indeed, expected return of peso assets decreases in the
2 0Normalizing the mean of the noise to zero is not a crucial assumption as the interest rate in pesos (rp) collects
any expected inflation bias.
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Figure 2-6: Increase in Inflationary Risk
inflationary risk (ao) and its variance is larger. From (2.30) and (2.31):
aE (Pr (Air > Rp) R,)
< O0e
avar (Pr (AiS > Rp) R,)
> O
ar
where Pr (Ai8 > Rps) is the probability of repayment of peso assets in the s-state.
The high peso-share equilibrium disappears for large enough inflation variance while the full
dollar equilibrium is robust as long as the condition in proposition 4 is satisfied.
An episode of large inflation volatility can trigger a jump into the complete dollarized credit
market equilibrium (see figure 2-6). Once the credit contracts are fully denominated in foreign
currency, the optimal policy is to reduce the devaluation response to aggregate shocks, which
perpetuates consumers' preference towards dollar assets. This equilibrium is stable even if the
mean preserving spread over inflation rate disappears or, in other words, reducing inflationary
risk will not make the market jump back to the low dollar-share equilibrium.
Summing up, during episodes of high inflationary risk, borrowers and lenders denominate
their credit contracts in a more stable unit, typically dollars. However, once inflation is con-
trolled and the countercyclicality of monetary policy is diminished, the motive behind demand
for dollar assets changes. Dollar assets are now demanded for their contingency against the risk
of recessions. In these economies, characterized by imperfect financial markets, dollar assets
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are the natural substitute for the missing contracts precisely because dollar instruments are in
place from the time of large inflationary risk.
2.5.2 The introduction of CPI-indexed bonds
In the debate on "de-dollarization" it has been often recommended the introduction of CPI-
indexed bonds.21 Indeed, if dollar denominated domestic assets are demanded as an insurance
against inflationary risk, consumers should substitute their holdings of dollar denominated
assets for CPI-indexed bonds. However, the fact that inflation indexed credit instruments are
not demanded over dollar denominated assets suggests that the underlying problem is not fear
of surprise inflation. Once inflationary risk is not the main source of volatility in savings, the
rationale for holding CPI-indexed bonds is not clear. In particular, if the motive for holding
dollar assets is their contingency against real shocks, the effectiveness of CPI-indexed bonds in
reducing the level of dollarization is, at best, limited.
In the context of this model, the full-dollarization equilibrium is robust to the introduction of
CPI-indexed bonds. Under the same conditions imposed in proposition 4, the optimal portfolio
for low devaluation response is again composed of only dollar denominated assets.
Entrepreneurs still choose an extreme currency composition of debt, in this case, either
fall dollar or full inflation adjustable contracts. In case of the later, entrepreneurs' expected
consumption is given by the following expression:
E (cesli = 1, rpi) (1 + ai,B) (A - rcp) + 1/2 (1 - a ,B) Az
acpi,B = A-r (2.32)Az
where vUi [0, 1] is the share of CPI-indexed debt (respectively (1 - i) is the share of dollar
denominated liabilities), rcpi is the corresponding interest rate, and api,B is the probability of
remaining active in the B-state, which is independent of 6.
The equilibrium interest rate is the one that induces the corporate sector to issue debt
according to consumers' demand for dollar and adjustable assets. As long as consumers diversify
Lheir portfolio composition, firms with dollar and CPI-indexed debt must coexist. Thus, the
'lSee ibid. conference on "Financial Dedollarization: Policy Options", 2003.
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equilibrium interest rate is the one that leaves firms indifferent between the two extremes of
debt composition:
E (ceslii = O, rd) = E (cfsi i = 1, rp)
Interest rates are equalized when 6 = 0 : rd (6 = 0) = rpi is pinned down from the free entry
condition (2.20). Since expected consumption of entrepreneurs with only CPI-indexed debt is
not affected by the size of the devaluation response, neither is rcpi:
Oarr- = ° (2.33)
06
Trivially, real claims on these assets are constant. That is, are not affected by surprised inflation.
However, the return on CPI-assets is still risky. Adjustable instruments inherit the default risk
of the issuing firms: api,B < 1.
As in section 3, in the limit when 6 = 0, consumers are constrained in their demand for
insurance and the credit market is fully dollarized. Using the results derived here for CPI-
indexed contracts, consumers maximize (2.12) subject to the following budget constraint:
CCB = iacpiBrco + (1-) aBORdB
where pi is the share of CPI-indexed instruments, and aBo and Rd, are defined as in section 3.
The first order condition for low devaluation response coincides with (2.28):
lim foc (6) =- [U U')- (cG)] aB + U' (ct) Az < 0
where aB = aBO (6 = 0) = aB1 ( = 0) = acri,B and r = rd (6 = 0) = rp (6 = 0) = rcpi.
Therefore, under the same condition as in proposition 2, the market is fully dollarized for
low devaluation response. Consumers are again constrained in their demand for insurance and
thus, the full dollar equilibrium is robust to the introduction of inflation adjustable contracts.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the one presented in the previous section.
When the devaluation response is low, consumers do not diversify the currency composition of
their portfolio. Again, risk averse consumers prefer dollar denominated assets, for which real
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zlaims are negatively correlated with the default risk, over CPI-indexed assets that offer zero
correlation with the risk of recessions.
Although, in light of these findings, the introduction of CPI-indexed bonds is not expected
to reduce the level of dollarization, it is a useful instrument to prevent the dollarization of the
credit market in periods of high inflationary risk.22 As was analyzed above, large volatility
of nominal variables can trigger the dollarization of credit contracts. The full dollarization
equilibrium is stable even after inflation is controlled, and robust to the introduction of CPI-
indexed instruments. However, inflation indexed instruments can substitute dollar denominated
contracts when the motive behind their demand is the fear of inflationary risk. The introduction
of these instruments can prevent the economy from abandoning the low dollar equilibrium during
periods of large inflationary risk.23
2.5.3 Open Capital Account
So far, it has been assumed that local consumers and entrepreneurs can only contract loans
in the domestic credit market, which is insulated from international capital flows. This sim-
plification tried to capture the behavior of small investors and firms, for whom the capital
account is often closed. The framework of the model is useful for analyzing the implications of
opening the capital account for atomistic agents. The complementarity between the residents'
portfolio choice and the optimal monetary policy remains, as well as the equilibrium with full
dollarization. However, the welfare consequences are very different.
To illustrate this point I assume risk neutral international investors willing to lend at a fixed
interest rate equal to rc -after controlling for default risk- denominated in foreign currency and,
conversely, local consumers can also invest abroad at the international interest rate.
Credit Market Equilibrium
The equilibrium interest rate differential between peso and dollar debt in (2.27) is un-
22The introduction of adjustable instruments may have downsides in terms of the level of inflation in equilibrium
(see, for example, Fisher and Summer (1989) ). Still, it is important to consider that the trade-off may involve
jumping into dollarization.
23 For example, Chile's adjustable instruments (Unidad de Fomento) date back to 1967 and were in place during
;ts period of high inflation. This economy succeeded in preserving the credit market largely denominated in local
currency. See Herrera and Valdes (2003) for a review on Chilean experience regarding indexation.
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changed:
E (c ,lvi = 1,) = E(c.Jv = O,1, )  rd)
However, the interest rate level is not pinned down from the free entry condition. Instead,
firms are willing to hold debt with local investors as long as the domestic interest rate in dollars
is not larger than the one offered by international investors:
2
rd < r aB (2.34)(1 + aBO)
Consumers' choice set is composed by domestic assets, denominated in dollars or pesos, and
foreign assets. Domestic dollar and peso assets have real claims given by (2.14) and (2.15),
with probabilities of default given by (2.22), evaluated at vi = 1 and vi = 0 respectively. Real
returns on foreign assets have the following schedule:
Res rc+ (1 -) s = B (2.35){rc- - r)5 s=G
Notice that consumers will never demand dollar denominated domestic assets. Indeed,
dollar domestic assets do not provide larger expected return than cross border investments and
face higher default risk. In other words, cross border assets are better at providing insurance
against the country risk than domestic dollar assets. As a result, firms with peso debt have
contracts with local consumers only, while firms with dollar liabilities exclusively contract with
foreigners. Equation (2.34) is thus satisfied with equality.
Again, there is a complementarity between consumers' portfolio choice and the optimal
monetary policy that results in multiple equilibria.
Policy Equilibrium with fixed exchange rate
When the Central Bank chooses a fixed exchange rate ( = 0), consumers unambiguously
prefer international assets. The first order condition characterizing the optimal portfolio choice
is
foc( ):-(1 + =) - aB r)[U(CB)-U(c)] = 0
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where aB = aB1 (6 = 0) = aBO (6 = 0) is the probability of survival in the B-state for domestic
firms with peso (vi = 1) and dollar (vi = 0) denominated debt. The first order condition is then
satisfied when c = c = r. As a counterpart, firms rely entirely on foreign investors.
The optimal devaluation rate is thus = 0, which allows domestic consumers to perfectly
smooth consumption. Consumption schedule is independent of domestic output volatility, which
is as large as in the full dollar equilibrium characterized in proposition 4.
Policy Equilibrium with countercyclical monetary policy
When monetary policy is countercyclical, consumers always demand a positive share of peso
domestic assets. First, because real return on international assets is risky in terms of domestic
prices. Second, because the default risk on peso assets lowers in the devaluation response,
so consumers demand less insurance -that is, fewer international assets. And third, because
the spread between the international and the domestic currency interest rates is positive -i.e.
(1 + aB) rp > 2rc.24
The optimal portfolio choice can be analyzed in terms of these three features, as appreciated
in the consumers' first order condition:
foc (s16) - [U' (c') -- U' ()] 6- U'(cB) (1- aBl) pB
+ [U' (C) + U (G)l (rp-r) = O
The first two terms in foc (MS6) correspond to the insurance motive behind the optimal
portfolio composition: the first term emphasizes the portfolio's currency risk and the second
term collects the demand for insurance due to the default risk on domestic assets. The third
term represents the demand for domestic assets due to the interest rate differential. Indeed,
"'lzimng equations (2.34) and (2.27), it can be shown that for
E B+ (0): [(1 + a) rp] > 0
Coreover ¥V: g8 [(1 + aBl) rp] < 0.
/.s long as parameters are such that 3 6 B1 E (0, 1): aBl (6B1) = 1,then for aI = 1 : r > r.
Therefore, for all relevant 56: (1 - aBl) rp > 2r.
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because the domestic interest rate is larger than the international, perfect insurance is not
optimal and consumers typically prefer an uneven consumption pattern as are compensated
with an overall larger expected consumption.
The Central Bank's objective function depends on the consumers' portfolio choice. Without
internalizing the effect of the devaluation response on the resulting equilibrium interest rate,
the Central Bank overvalues insurance.
f oc(6lt) = - - - J [U () - v' (U' )]
+ U'(C ) /[0aBl RpB A r + (1-aBO o
The bias towards insurance can be appreciated in the comparison of the Central Bank's
first order condition, foc(61), and the consumers' foc(.I16). The CB's first order condition
collects the devaluation effect on insurance: the CB's foc (I ) is parallel to the first two terms
in consumers' foc (Al6). The optimal policy does not take into consideration its effect on the
interest rate spread, collected in the last term of consumers' foc (1I6).25
Foreign assets provide the insurance that domestic firms are not able to. Hence, consumers
can perfectly hedge against the risk of default independently of the Central Bank's intervention.
Instead, the role of the Central Bank is to increase expected consumption. However, a time
inconsistent Central Bank will typically try to increase the level of insurance. Indeed, although
consumers are able to perfectly smooth consumption, they optimally decide not to in order to
enjoy a larger expected consumption.26 The Central Bank, without internalizing its effect on the
equilibrium interest rate, partially undoes consumers' optimal choice and increases consumption
smoothness.
From CB's foc (6It) and consumers' foc (i6), the policy equilibrium for (1 + aB) rp > 2rc
is given by j > 1 - r and 6B1 > 6 > 0, where 6B1 satisfies aBl (6 B1) = 1.27
25It can be easily verified from consumers' foc (A6 ) and CB's foc (6 1p), that if the uncovered parity condition
holded (rv (1 + aBl) = 2rc), the first best would be attained. That is, the Central Bank optimum is a such that
aBl (6) = 1 (and 8a_.L = 0). Firms with peso debt have zero default risk so consumers optimal portfolio choice
is p = 1 - , which provides perfect hedge against the currency risk.
26This result is in line with Holmstrom and Tirole (2002). There, foreign investors are in position to provide
insurance to domestic firms when country shocks are idiosyncratic. Still, perfect insurance is not optimal.
2 7Imagine < 1 - . From consumers' foc (pjl) :(1 + aBl) rv > 2rc == cB < CG.
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The equilibrium with countercyclical policy is unambiguously better than the one under
fixed exchange rate. Indeed, the fixed exchange rate case was characterized by perfect insurance
and c = c = r. An allocation with perfect insurance and fixed consumption pattern with
cB = c > r is attainable under any positive devaluation response. So the uneven consumption
schedule chosen by consumers is unambiguously superior to the one under fixed exchange rate.
Hence, by holding domestic peso assets, consumers provide incentives to the Central Bank to
pursue a countercyclical monetary policy and higher utility level is attained.28
2.6 Conclusion
After years of high inflationary risk, many developing countries succeeded in stabilizing their
monetary variables. Today, these economies' concerns center on underinsurance against aggre-
gate shocks. The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate this topic from the perspective
cf risk averse residents, whose consumption volatility is mainly driven by the risk of recession.
n this framework, dollar assets are demanded as an insurance against real aggregate risks.
Based on the interplay between the currency composition of the credit market and the Cen-
tral Bank's optimal policy, the model explains persistence in the share of dollar liabilities in
economies with low inflationary risk. Indeed, this interplay may result in multiple stable equi-
libria: an equilibrium with a high degree of dollarization in which the Central Bank minimizes
exchange rate volatility; and another in which contracts are mainly denominated in domestic
currency and monetary policy is highly countercyclical.
When insurance against the risk of recession is the motive behind dollarization, consumers
are better off under full dollarization than with a high share of peso denominated contracts.
If the share of peso denominated contracts is large, the optimal policy reduces the number of
defaulting firms at the expense of a more volatile return on savings. On the other hand, in
the fully dollarized equilibrium, the real value of savings is preserved during recessions, when
From CB's foc(6l): < 1 - = 6 > B1.
From consumers' foc (16)): aB = 1 > 1 - r, which is a contradiction.
Then: / > 1 - r.
Follows from CB's foc(611), that as long as c < c and p > 1 - r, the CB's optimal devaluation response
.is <B1.
28In Tirole (2003) domestic investment also functions as a discipline device for the Central Banker, who is only
:oncerned about residents' welfare.
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investors value it the most.
An important caveat must be made. In an attempt to emphasize the interplay between credit
market currency composition and the optimal monetary policy, the framework was simplified to
only include agents participating in the domestic financial market. However, concerns regarding
dollarization arise from its negative consequences in terms of output volatility. For that reason,
the current debate in many of these countries is centered on the "de-dollarization" dilemma.
This model, by explaining the motives underlying the dollarization of domestic credit contracts,
offers some insights to this debate:
1. Although an increase in inflationary risk may trigger the dollarization of the credit mar-
ket, price stabilization will have limited success in reducing it. During episodes of high
inflationary risk, borrowers and lenders denominate their credit contracts in a more sta-
ble unit, typically dollars. However, once inflation is controlled and the countercyclicality
of the monetary policy is diminished, the motive behind the demand for dollar assets
changes. Dollar assets are now demanded for their contingent value against the risk of
recessions. In these economies, foreign currency denominated assets are the natural sub-
stitute for the missing contingent contracts precisely because dollar instruments are in
place from the time of large inflationary risk.
2. If dollar assets are demanded for their insurance capacity, the introduction of CPI-indexed
bonds will have limited success in reducing the level of dollarization. Adjustable instru-
ments are only useful when inflationary risk is the motive behind the demand for foreign
currency denominated contracts. These instruments do not provide any insurance against
the risk of recession. Nonetheless, CPI-indexed bonds are useful for preventing the dol-
larization of the credit market in periods of high inflationary risk.
3. The persistence of the level of dollarization results from the interplay between currency
denomination of contracts and a time inconsistent monetary policy. Monetary policy func-
tions both as an ex-ante incentive device and as an ex-post redistributive tool between
consumers and entrepreneurs. This juxtaposition of functions causes monetary policy's
time inconsistency. The goal is then to separate these two roles, incorporating in the
debate on "de-dollarization" either fiscal considerations aimed of including a different re-
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distributive tool, or corrective distortions in the retur, on assets so lenders and borrowers
internalize the effects of their currency choice.
Finally, the underlying structure of the model is a useful tool for analyzing the implications of
improving access to foreign capital for atomistic consumers and firms, a basic example of which
was analyzed in section 5. The complementarity between the Central Bank's optimal policy and
the consumers' portfolio choice is still present in the extreme case of perfect access to foreign
capital. In this case, foreign instruments can perfectly insure consumers against country risk
and consumers are better off if the Central Bank pursues a coutercyclical monetary policy. This
is the appropriate framework within which to explore this topic, since it formulates the problem
as a trade-off between insurance to consumers against country risk and the vulnerability of a
highly dollarized corporate sector. Moreover, under this framework the monetary authority's
incentives change according to the nationality of the investors. This paper discussed a particular
example. More general applications are a topic for future research.
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2.7 Appendix:
2.7.1 Expansionary effect of devaluation
The model can be extended with the introduction of an expansionary effect of devaluation,
which provides a motive for devaluing the currency in the adverse state of nature. This way,
the restriction imposed in section 4 that constrained the Central Bank from revaluing the
currency in the B-state arises endogenously.
Modification to the Basic Framework
I extend the basic framework presented in section 2 with an additional date. At date 0, all
contracts are set according to the basic set-up described in section 2. At date 1, after contracts
are set, the productive project has an intermediate productive outcome and operational cost,
wages.29 Wages are assumed to be set at date 0 in terms of non-tradable goods. For simplicity, I
assume risk neutral workers with a constant opportunity cost in terms of consumption (w = 1).
Each productive unit has then short term and long term outcome (Alis and A2i8), a pro-
portion r of which is tradable, and the rest is non-tradable. The technology is affected by the
aggregate shock and a unobservable idiosyncratic sensitivity towards it, as described in (2.2).
Total output at date t E {1, 2} is therefore given by Ati8 = At (1 + aizs). In addition to the
unit of capital (k = 1), the productive project requires hiring a date-1 worker.
As before, the firm abandons the market and defaults on its debt if date-2 revenues do
not suffice to repay financial debts. This extension introduces another source of default: the
firm is forced to abandon the market irrespectively of its overall profits if date-1 revenues
do not suffice to cover operational costs. I make parametric assumptions to ensure that in
equilibrium firms default in the B-state only: min {Al - w, A2 - r > 1/2z max {A1, A2}, where
r = rd (d = ) = rp (d = 0).
It can be verified that the goods market is in equilibrium for the same set of prices presented
in section 2 and the inflation rate in the s-state, r8, is given by equation (2.11). Therefore,
the firm continues in the market at date 1 in the B-state if AliB > w - r6.30 That is, if the
29Any nontradable input would suffice to introduce an expansionary effect of devaluation.
30As in section 2, the real value the operational cost is approximated for inflation rate close to zero and wages
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sensitivity towards the shock is lower than the threshold value aL:
A, - (w - r6)
ai < aL = (2.36)
Alz
As before, the firm repays its debts date 2 if ai < aB (vi), where aB (vi) is given by (2.22).
The ex-ante probability of repaying financial obligation is therefore given the probability of
continuing in both periods:3'
Pr (repay) = min {aL, aB (vi)}
The characterization of the credit market equilibrium when the devaluation schedule is such
that the date-2 constraint is binding (6: aB (vi) < aL) is in line with proposition 4.32 In what
follows, I analyze the case in which the date-i constraint binds.
Firms' optimal currency composition of liabilities when date-1 constraint is binding
Entrepreneurs choose vi E [0, 1] to maximize expected consumption. If the date-1 con-
straint is binding, the threshold value for continuation at date 1, aL, is lower than aB (vi) and
close to one with:
w
1+ -WIl - 1r. = W - T 6 ,1+ro
31Notice that although a firm i defaults on its debt every time ai > a (vi), its overall profits may still
be positive if ai < aL. Firms' idiosyncratic shock is not observable, therefore date-1 profits are also private
information. As a result, when the exit decision occurs at date 2, the firm retains date-1 profits.
32Without changing qualitatively the results presented in proposition 4, the equilibrium interest rates (before
cescribed by (2.27)) are now given by:
Orp 1 - aL 1 - al
-- -T 7-
a - 1 +asl 1+aBl
Ord 1- aL + (1 -) - a
0" 1+aBo - 1+aBo
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determines the probability of remaining active in the two periods.
max E (cie) = aL [E (cis Ici, > 0) + E (ci 8 Icli > 0)]0<vi<l
s.t.
c 8is = Ali 8 - (w - r68)
cis = A2is - (1 - Vi) Rds - iRps
The probability of being active in the B-state, captured in (2.36), is independent of the
currency composition of debt. Therefore, the entrepreneur's expected consumption is linear in
vi:
OE (c~8)
aL (rp - rd - 6 ) + (rp - rd + )Ovi
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs are indifferent in the currency composition of their debt and
the expected real claims for dollar and peso debt are equalized. The equilibrium is characterized
by the following interest rate differential:
1 - aL
rd - rp= +aL (2.37)
Entrepreneurs are indifferent in the currency composition of their liabilities and the share
of peso denominated debt (vi) is then determined in equilibrium by investors (consumers):
Vi E [0, 1]: vi = (2.38)
Consumers portfolio choice when date-1 constraint is binding
Consumers choose p E [0, 1] to maximize expected utility (2.12) subject to their budget
constraint. Real claims on dollar and peso assets are given by (2.14) and (2.15). And, as long
as date-1 margin is binding, the probability of default is independent of vi. Therefore, the
probability of default for both assets is equal to at. Consumers' budget constraint is therefore
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given by:
CB = aL [SRpB + (1 - ) dB]
c = Rp + (1-A) RdG
Using (2.36) and (2.37), the first order condition for the consumers' maximization problem
is:
a [U (G) - U (C)] = 0 (2.39)
provided that E [0,1] . And, if foc(Li = 016) < 0 or foc(t = 116) > 0, the optimal share of
peso assets reaches the constraints 1, = 0 and it = 1 respectively.
As long as the devaluation response is not null, the interior solution for (2.39) implies equal-
ization of marginal utilities U' (CB) = U' (cc). If devaluations happen in negative realizations
of the aggregate shock ( > 0), dollar assets have larger real return in the B-state and provide
insurance against the default risk.
The interior optimal share of peso assets results from equalizing consumption in both states:
1 + aL
4a- [- (1 -- aL)rd + (1 + aL) (1 - r)6] (2.40)
The demand for dollar denominated assets decreases in the devaluation response for two reasons:
First, since the default risk decreases in the devaluation response 6, so does the demand for
insurance. And second, a larger devaluation response augments the contingent value of dollar
assets and a lower quantity of such assets is required to provide the optimal insurance.
The interior solution cannot be achieved for low devaluation responses. If the contingent
value of dollar debt is minimal, perfect insurance requires long positions of these assets and the
short selling constraint binds. In that case, the share of peso denominated assets reaches its
:,>wer bound (lima-o0 p (6) = 0). Inversely, when the devaluation is large enough as to prevent
any firm from defaulting (aL = 1), the optimal currency composition in (2.40) is the one that
perfectly hedges against the currency risk, that is, the portfolio composition replicates the
participation of tradables and non-tradables in the price index ( = 1 - r).
Then, for 6s E {,-6} such that Vvi E [0, 1] aL < aB (vi), the credit market equilibrium is
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aL
aB
0 61
Figure 2-7: Binding Margin for Default
characterized by (2.37), (2.38), and:
< < AL: / () = O where AL: foc(I = OI0L) = 0
6 > AL:p()= 1--rwhereL: aLt(L)=1
Optimal Devaluation Response
The Central Bank maximizes consumers' expected utility by intervening in the currency
market at date 1, after all contracts have been set, in line with section 4. The return on
assets depends on the binding margin governing the default risk, which is endogenous to the
devaluation response (see figure 2-7). When the exchange rate volatility is very large, the
balance sheet effect governs the default risk -i.e. ao < aL. When the devaluation response is
low, revenues are not sufficient to pay the operational cost and the firm is forced to abandon
the market -i.e. aL < aBO.
Whenever the date-1 constraint is binding, the optimal monetary policy is to increase the
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devaluation response. For < L, an increase in the devaluation response increases both
expected consumption and insurance. While for 6 > AL, consumers attain perfect insurance
and an increase in the devaluation response raises expected consumption without affecting
smoothness. Indeed, as long as the size of the financial obligations is not the motive driving
the default decision, there is no trade-off between insurance and maximization of consumption
and it is always optimal to reduce the number of firms abandoning the market.
However, once the default is driven by balance sheet considerations, the optimal devaluation
response depends dramatically on the currency composition of debt. As explained in section
4, as long as (2.29) is negative, when the credit market is mainly denominated in pesos, the
Central Bank finds it optimum to increase the devaluation response. This policy reduces even
further date-1 operational cost and the probability of default unambiguously decreases:
( = 1) = max {1, l}
where 61 : aL (1) = aB1 (j) and 61 is the optimum given that the date-2 constraint is binding
-i.e. : foc (1IlI[ = 1) = 0 given that aBl (1) < aL (1).
When the credit market is highly dollarized, an increase in the devaluation response has
opposite effects on date-1 and date-2 default margins. An increase in the devaluation response
reduces date-1 operational cost but increases date-2 financial burden, therefore, the optimal
devaluation policy is the one for which the two margins are equivalent:
( =0) =O
where 6 : aL () aBO (o) -
This extension endogenizes a lower bound for the optimal devaluation response: 6 > Jo. As
long as o E [0, AE] (see proposition 3), the results presented in the body of the paper hold.
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2.7.2 Share of Foreign Currency Denominated Deposits in Domestic Bank-
ing Sector
Selected Country Year
Angola 2001 81.0%
Argentina 2001 73.7%
Armenia 2001 79.7%
Azerbaijan 2001 81.1%
Belarus 2001 65.9%
Bulgaria 2001 57.1%
Bolivia 2001 91.7%
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 2001 56.8%
China, P.R.: Hong Kong 2001 45.0%
Cambodia 2000 92.5%
Costa Rica 2001 43.8%
Georgia 2001 81.4%
Croatia 2001 71.2%
Haiti 2001 42.5%
Kazakhstan 2001 57.0%
Kyrgyz Republic 2001 65.2%
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 2001 82.9%
Lebanon 2001 69.1%
Lithuania 2001 46.6%
Latvia 2001 43.9%
Mongolia 2001 39.3%
Mozambique 2001 55.1%
Macedonia, FYR 2001 65.4%
Nicaragua 2001 71.1%
Peru 2001 66.0%
Philippines 2001 30.7%
Paraguay 2001 66.9%
Romania 2001 49.0%
Russia 2001 34.3%
Slovenia 2001 36.1%
Sao Tome & Principe 2001 44.4%
Tanzania 2001 32.9%
Turkmenistan 1999 44.7%
Turkey 2001 58.3%
Tajikistan 2000 67.8%
Ukraine 2001 32.4%
Uruguay 2001 84.4%
Vietnam 1998 36.6%
Vanuatu 1999 69.7%
Yemen, Republic of 2001 52.6%
Zambia 2001 42.6%
Sources: Levy-Yeyati (2003) and Arteta (2002, 2003)
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2.7.3 Dollarization and Inflation
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Chapter 3
Idiosyncratic and Aggregate Risk in
the Presence of Government's Moral
Hazard
3.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy and taxation in particular play an important role in the insurance of local agents
against income fluctuations. Government's power to impose taxes is a key tool for optimal redis-
tribution among residents. Indeed, if agents cannot pledge their future income in the financial
market, a domestic insurance market cannot privately arise. Local agents rely on government's
tax power to diversify their idiosyncratic domestic income risk. Moreover, Government's fiscal
policy also plays a role in the international risk sharing. Public debt represents future local
tax income. Then, trading public debt in the international financial market allows country risk
sharing.
Optimal risk sharing involves foreign investors holding domestic public debt, which intro-
duces government's moral hazard. Because the government prevails local interests over foreign
ones, the identity of the bond holders affects the ex-post optimal fiscal policy. This paper
looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects the capacity of resident
agents to optimally diversify risk. I find that government's moral hazard introduces a trade-off
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between pooling idiosyncratic risk and diversifying aggregate country uncertainty. As a result,
local agents face excessive consumption risk.
The model in this paper represents risk averse consumers, who want to diversify domestic
idiosyncratic risk and share the aggregate country risk in the international financial market.
They are unable to pledge their future random return, which introduces the government's role.
The government, who has the tax power, commits on behalf of local agents to deliver the
promised goods to the share holders. In other words, domestic and international risk sharing
are mediated by government's intervention.
Opening the capital account allows local agents to diversify aggregate country risk but
also introduces government's moral hazard. Since taxes are levied exclusively on residents
while bond returns are accrued in part by foreign investors, the government has incentives to
lower taxes and reduce the return on public debt. Participants in the financial market adjust
their demand for domestic bonds according to their credible return. Their equilibrium price
also reflects government's future optimal policy. As a result, government's moral hazard does
not affect international risk diversification. Domestic and foreign agents minimize aggregate
risk at actuarially fair prices. However, government's moral hazard does affect internal tax
policy, which is insufficient from an ex-ante point of view. Domestic fiscal policy pools risk
suboptimally.
I explore how institutions can be designed as to overcome this moral hazard problem. It
is optimal for the government to impose private non-transferable savings account composed
of domestic bonds. By forcing residents to hold government bonds, the government restricts
itself from expropriating bond holders in the future and can credibly commit to follow a Pareto
superior policy. This commitment device is costly: it results in a suboptimal international risk
sharing. The first best allocation will not be attained and the optimal restriction results from
the trade-off between idiosyncratic and aggregate risk diversification.
I extend the baseline model to an infinitely repeated economy with overlapping genera-
tions. I analyze the conditions under which reputation can work as a commitment device for
the government. In those cases that it does, the government implements the ex-ante optimal
policy under the threat that any deviation will be punished by reversion to the Markov Perfect
Equilibrium. The ability to commit depends on the instantaneous gains from deviating from
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the promised policy, versus the cost in terms of a suboptimal one thereafter. As expected,
reputation works as a commitment technology if the government's intertemporal discount is
sufficiently high. More interesting, reputation is less likely to support the ex-ante policy in
economies with high idiosyncratic risk. When the idiosyncratic risk is higher, the government
implements a policy closer to the ex-ante optimal after abandoning the rule. Then, the rever-
sion to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium does not represent a sufficient threat. Along the same
lines, imposing minimum requirements of domestic bonds on the pension funds improves fiscal
policy, but it may deprive the government from a costless commitment technology.
The model in this paper is related to the literature on sovereign risk and, in particular,
to Tirole (2003). As in there, government's moral hazard varies with the proportion of local
and foreign investors holding domestic debt. In this paper, I identify a mechanism through
which government's actions towards foreign investors also affects local residents: government's
suboptimal fiscal policy prevents the diversification of domestic idiosyncratic risk. I find that
the relative importance of idiosyncratic and aggregate risks plays a key role in determining the
government's optimal fiscal policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the static version of the
model with a single generation of agents interacting with the government for two periods. I
characterize here the commitment problem of the government and provide rationality for the use
of minimum requirements on bond holdings as a commitment device. In section 3, I extend the
basic static framework into a dynamic economy. I characterize the stationary Markov Perfect
Equilibrium and analyze the conditions under which reputation can work as a commitment
device for the implementation of the ex-ante optimal fiscal policy. Finally, section 4 concludes.
3.2 Static Framework
The model presented here describes a world with two countries: home and abroad. Each
country is populated by a unit measure of consumers, alive for two periods. Agents have
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CARA preferences over consumption at time 1 and 2:
U = u(cl)+ Eu (c 2) (3.1)
() = _e-YC
-
There is a single good, used as numeraire, which is received by agents as endowment in the
first and second periods. At date 1, domestic endowment is a deterministic amount wl (w for
foreigners), while endowment in the second period is uncertain: each resident agent i E [0, 1]
receives wis = w + i units of goods in the second period (foreign agents get w*). The aggregate
risk is given by the realization of (w, w*), while i corresponds to pure idiosyncratic domestic
risk:
(ws, w) : N (w, w*; 2, *2, fd) (3.2)
ei ' iid.N (O, o72)
At date 1, before the realization of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, agents make
their consumption/saving decision and choose their portfolio allocation. Each agent i can
save in three ways: shares of future domestic endowment of each domestic agent j (Bid,j), a
share of future foreign endowment (Bif), and a riskless storage technology that transform one
unit of date-1 good into 1 + r units of date-2 good (Bio). That is, the strategy of each local
agent i E [0,1] is a vector Bi = {Bio, (Bid,j)=0, Bif} E R, while for each foreign agent is
B= {B° B) B,j j= "f R.
Finally, to assure a constant consumption schedule, I assume that 2 = 1+1+r'
3.2.1 Optimal allocation
As a benchmark, I characterize here the financial market equilibrium that corresponds to the
first best allocation. In this frictionless economy foreign and domestic agents are able to sell
(and buy) their future endowments in the financial market.
In period 1, each local agent i E [0, 1] receives her date-1 endowment wl and sells her future
endowment wis at a market price Pid. She consumes an amount cil and buys shares of foreign
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and domestic (from each local agent j [0,1]) endowments. The remaining resources are
invested in the riskless technology. At date 2, and in each state of nature s, the agent consumes
cis according the the return on her assets: shares on foreign and domestic (from each agent
j [0, 1]) endowments have returns w and wjs respectively; and the return on the storage
technology is 1 + r.
Therefore, financial market equilibrium consistent with the first best allocation is defined
as follows:
Definition 3 The first best financial market equilibrium is a combination of strategies and
market prices {(Bi)iLo, 3*, (Pid)i=0oPf such that:
(i) Bi = {Bio, (Bid,j)=o Bif} E 3 maximizes (3.1) subject to:
cil + Bio + Bid,jpjdd + Bifpf = W1 + Pid
Cis = Bo (1 + r) + Bid,jwjsdj + Bifw*
(ii) 3' {Bo, (Bdj 1oB} · R3 maximizes (3.1) subject to:
c + Bo* + Bd,jpjddj + Bpf = w1 + pf
c = Bo* ( + r) + | B*,jwjdj + BWfW
(iii) And (Pid)!O ,Pf} are such that the market clearing conditions are satisfied:
j [0,1]: 1Bidjdi + Bj = 1
Bf + B = 1
Since idiosyncratic risk is perfectly diversifiable, the price of individual domestic endowments
wi, is identical for all i [0, 1] : Pid = Pd. Therefore, all domestic agents are ex-ante identical.
Moreover, the optimal allocation on risky assets is independent of the level of wealth. It follows
that all agents (foreign and domestic) have the same optimal portfolio, characterized by the
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following first order conditions:
foc(Bd) : -Pd + [ - y (Bd 2 + Bffd)] = (3.3)
foc(Bf) : -pf + o [* - -y(Bfa*2 + Bdfd)] = 0 (3.4)
where Bd = fo1 Bd,jdj is the perfectly diversified domestic asset. Finally, because the intertem-
poral discount is the reciprocal of the return on the risk-free asset, the optimal demand for
risk-free assets equalizes marginal utilities of consumption over time:
foc (Bo) : -U' (cl) + EU' (cis) = 0 (3.5)
where for cl = ci,1 for all i.
Combining the first order conditions with the market clearing conditions, the decentralized
equilibrium that corresponds to the first best allocation is given by the following portfolio
composition and prices:
Bd = B* = ~ (3.6)
1
Bf = B = 2 (3.7)
f /3 [W - (a*2 + afd)] (3.8)
Pd = Pid = [ - fd)] (3.9)
Welfare depends on preferences and the country-endowment distribution:
U = (1 + )u(cl)
where : c=1 = 1 [wl + 6w - 32Y Var (ci) - O/ (2 _ -*2)] (3.10)1 + 2 4
U* = (1+/ )u(c*)
where · c = 1 [w + w* - Var (c)- (o 2)] (3.11)Cl 12 
Var (c*) = Var (cis)= (02 + a*2 + 20Ufd) (3.12)
As expected, consumption of both foreign and local agents increase in the agents' discounted
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expected total endowment. The covariance matrix affects consumption in two ways. First,
precautionary savings increase with non-diversifiable risk -i.e. Var (cs) -. Since both local and
foreign investors hold the same amount of risky assets, the variance of domestic and foreign
consumption is identical. And second, through its effect on prices, residents' consumption
decreases on 2, since residents are net suppliers of domestic assets, and increases in cr 2,
because that reduces the price of the asset for which residents are net demanders. The symmetric
opposite characterizes foreign agents' consumption.
3.2.2 Imperfect Financial Market
Because atomistic agents have no power to levy taxes, consumers cannot commit at time 1 to
share their future endowment with other agents. However, the government has that tax power;
that is, it can expropriate local agents of their endowment and commit on their behalf to deliver
the date-2 domestic endowment to the share holders. In effect, a government intervention can
replicate the first best allocation.
The government issues a state-contingent bond that pays Rs at time 2. It taxes residents
at time 1 and 2, with a tax rate 1 and r2 chosen before the shocks are realized. The storage
technology is also available for the government: it can transform a unit of date-1 good into
(1 + r) units of date-2 goods. So the government chooses the policy p = ({T, -T2, Rs) E WI3 to
maximize (3.1) subject to date 1 and date 2 budget constraints:
t = 1: 0 _< 1w +Pd (3.13)
t = 2: R = r2w + (lwl + Pd) (1 + r) (3.14)
The law of large number holds, so the return on government bonds is only contingent on the
aggregate risk.
For simplicity, I introduce this lack of commitment to domestic agents only. The return on
foreign bonds is still given by w in period 2 and state s.
In this section I first characterize the financial market equilibrium for a given policy vector
{T-, T2, Rs}. Then, I analyze the optimal government intervention. A credible government that
maximizes residents' welfare can achieve the first best allocation. In this case, the government
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chooses the policy internalizing its effect on the equilibrium level of consumption. However,
without a commitment device, the government has incentives to deviate from the ex-ante opti-
mal rule. If date-2 tax rate r2 is chosen after date-1 financial decisions are set, the government
has incentives to impose a sub-optimal (from an ex-ante point of view) tax policy. Because
domestic bonds are hold both by local and foreign investors, the government has incentives to
reduce ex-post the return on bonds and lower the domestic tax burden accordingly. This policy
is inefficient and results in an imperfect diversification of domestic idiosyncratic risk.
3.2.3 Financial Market Equilibrium
As has been described above, the strategy of each local agent consist of three actions B =
{Bd, Bf , Bo} E R3 -correspondingly, the strategy of a foreign investors is B* = {B, B*, B } E
I3-. The financial market equilibrium for a given policy P = {-1, T2, Rs) is defined as follows:
Definition 4 For a given policy P = {T1 , T2, Rs} that satisfies (3.13) and (3.14), a financial
market equilibrium is a combination of strategies and market prices {B, B*,Pd, pf such that:
(i) B = {Bo, Bd, Bf} E IR maximizes (3.1) subject to:
cl + Bo + Bdpd + Bfpf = w1 (1 - r1 ) (3.15)
cis= (1 - 2 )wi + Bo (1 + r) + BdR + BfwS (3.16)
(ii) 13* = {B*, B, } E IR maximizes (3.1) subject to:
c*B + B + B f + fpf= w + p(3.17)
c = B (1 + r) + BR + Bw (3.18)
(iii) The equilibrium prices {Pd, pf are such that the market clearing conditions are satisfied:
Bd+B* = 1 (3.19)
Bf + B = 1 (3.20)
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The first order conditions that characterize the optimal demands for domestic and foreign
assets are, for local investors:
foc(Bf) : -pf + [w* -y {Bfa*2 + [1 -2 (1 -Bd)] afd}] =0 (3.21)
foc(Bd) : -d + [f - Y-2 {[1 - T2 (1 - Bd)] a2 + Bfafd}] = 0 (3.22)
and for foreign investors:
foc (By) : -pf + [* - -y {B* 2 + B-2afd}] = 0 (3.23)
foc(B) : -Pd + [R-Y7- 2 {Br 2o2 + Bafd] = (3.24)
where R corresponds to the expected return on domestic bonds R = f_ Rsf (ws) dws
The optimal exposure to risk is independent of the wealth level. Thus, domestic and foreign
agents will have the same exposure to domestic and foreign uncertainty in equilibrium, as in
the first best allocation. From (3.21) and (3.23), domestic and foreign consumers face foreign
risk in the amount Bf and B} respectively. Then, the credit market equilibrium satisfies the
market clearing condition (3.20) and Bf = B, which implies that the demand for foreign shares
is equal to the first best equilibrium:
1
Bf = B = 2 (3.25)
In the case of domestic risk, the total holdings of future domestic endowment is not equal to
the demanded domestic contingent bond. From (3.22), residents not only hold domestic endow-
ment in the amount Bdr2, they also have an amount (1 - r2) of their own risky endowment.
Therefore, residents' total exposure to domestic risk is [1 - 2 (1 - Bd)], while foreigners' is
only given by their share of domestic bonds: Bdr2. As a result, the market for domestic shares
is in equilibrium when (3.19) is satisfied and Bdr 2 = [1 - 2 (1 - Bd)], which implies:
Bd = 22 - (3.26)d T22 B r- (3.26)2-2
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Residents' demand for domestic bonds increases in the tax rate T2. A larger tax rate decreases
residents' exposure to their own endowment risk, which has a sovereign risk component -i.e.
Var (wis) = 0i2 + U2_. Then, residents are willing to hold more domestic bonds when the
exposure to their own endowment risk is lower. In the case of foreign investors, their demand
of domestic bonds lowers in 2 , since higher tax rate increases the variance of domestic bonds.
The equilibrium prices that sustain the market allocations are:
Pd = R [- 2T2 ( + Ufd)] (3.27)
p = [w2 (2 + fd)] (3.28)
where R denotes the expected return on domestic asset.
Finally, since the return on the risk-free asset is the reciprocal of the intertemporal discount
rate, condition (3.5) is again satisfied for all agents.
3.2.4 Ex-ante optimal government intervention
The first best allocation can be attained if the government can credibly commit to follow the
ex-ante optimal policy. That is, the government chooses a policy P ={RsR,Tl, T2 E R3 that
maximizes:
max u (ci) + OEu (ci,)
{Rs,rl, ,r2}
s.t.
CE (cjs) = cl (3.29)
1 + [w + - 2 Var (cis)-p / ( 2 _ - 2) (3.30)
~1/ 3.30-2 )
where: Var (cis) = 4 (02 + 2afd) + (1 - 2 ) 2 ci
Budget Constraints (3.13) and (3.14)
where, CE (cis) denotes for Certainty Equivalent of cis. Combining (3.5), (3.25)-(3.28), and
(3.15)-(3.16), the equations (3.30) and (3.29) correspond to the equilibrium consumption sched-
ule for residents given a policy vector {Rs,T1, 2}.
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The ex-ante optimal tax schedule is therefore:
2 = 1
TlW1 = -(- [- + O'fd)]
The optimal tax rate at date 2 prevents residents from facing any idiosyncratic risk. And gov-
ernment's transfers to the residents at date 1 correspond to the discounted certainty equivalent
of date 2-tax revenues. The first best allocation is attained.
The expected return on domestic bonds R (and therefore the optimal government's invest-
ment in the storage technology) is undetermined. It does not affect the covariance matrix,
which only depends on the policy choice T 2 , and it is fully accounted for in the equilibrium
price (3.27). Summarizing, since agents and the government have the same storage technology,
changes in R do not alter the consumption schedule in (3.30) and (3.29).
3.2.5 Time inconsistent Government
The ex-ante government policy leads the economy to the first best allocation. However, this
policy may not be optimal ex-post because, once investment decisions have been made, a
lower date-2 tax rate 2 can increase local agents' expected consumption by expropriating
foreign investors. Here, the government chooses date-2 tax rate 72 -and therefore the return on
domestic shares- after the portfolio choice is set and before the realization of the shocks. The
policy equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 5 Policy Equilibrium is a combination of strategies and market prices ({P, B, 3*, Pd, Pf)
such that:
(i) { B, B*,Pd, pf is a Financial Market Equilibrium given P = {71, -2, Rs)
(ii) r1 maximizes government's objective at time 1: u (cl) + /3Eu(cis) given the budget
constraint (3.13)
(iii) {72, Rs) maximizes government's objective at time 2: Eu(cis), given {,B*,pd,pf}
and subject to the budget constraint (3.14).
The policy equilibrium is characterized by backwards induction. At date 2, for a given finan-
cial market equilibrium 13, 13*,pd,pf} and date-1 policy T1, the government chooses {Rs, -2) E
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RI2 to maximize
max EU(ci,)
{I 2 ,Rs}
s.t.
Rs = 'T2W + (W1 + Pd) (1 + r)
Ci = wis(1 -T 2)+BO(1 ) + BdRs + BfwS (3.31)
At the time of choosing { Rs, 72 } investors already made their financial decisions and agreed
on a price for domestic bonds. Then, the policy does not alter the holdings of domestic bonds
or its price. In other words, the government chooses its policy without internalizing its effect
on already taken financial decisions. Therefore, it maximizes the ex-post consumption level
in (3.31), instead of the equilibrium consumption level in (3.30). However, the government's
optimal policy feeds back into investors' expectation. As a result, from an ex-ante perspective,
the government's optimal tax rate is suboptimal and results in a suboptimal diversification of
domestic risk.
The first order condition that characterizes the optimal date-2 tax rate and the return on
the domestic asset is:
(1 - 2) i
-(1 -Bd)W + Y + [1 -2 (1-Bd)] (1-Bd) 2 =0 (332)
+ (1 - Bd) Bf oafd
The return on assets Rs is financed through taxes. While taxes are levied entirely on
residents, the return on assets goes to share holders, which only a proportion Bd are residents.
Therefore, expected consumption of residents decreases on T2 in an amount (1 - Bd) w, which
corresponds to the first term in equation (3.32). The government, who does not consider
foreigners' utility in its welfare objective, has incentives to reduce taxes and return on domestic
asset. However, the optimal tax rate and return on domestic asset will not be zero. Because
domestic government bonds are used to diversify aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, a time-
inconsistent government will still find it optimal to tax residents and pay a positive return on
domestic shares. An increase in r 2 reduces the variance of consumption, as can be observed in
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the second term in (3.32).
The optimal date-2 tax rate as a function of residents' portfolio is presented in equation
(3.33). It is a positive function of residents' holdings of domestic assets and the variance of
both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk:
1-(1- [Bd 2 + Bf fd]
_-2 -1 - (1 - B) (3.33)
'7y [(1- Bd)2a2+a]
Domestic bonds are not only used for international risk diversification, they also play a key
role in the domestic financial system: since agents cannot commit their future endowment, they
use government bonds to diversify the idiosyncratic risk. As a result, the larger the diversifiable
risk, the lower the time inconsistency problem of the government. Indeed, in the limit of infinite
idiosyncratic risk, the optimal tax rate coincides with the ex-ante optimum: lim,2 T2 = 1.
The ex-post optimal policy {72, Rs) feeds back into the agents expectation and the resulting
market equilibrium at date 1. The policy equilibrium is the set of fix points for which the
market's foreseen policy coincides with the ex-post government optimum. Combining (3.26)
and (3.25) with (3.33), the equilibrium date-2 tax rate is implicitly defined by:
- (.2 + Ufd)
T2 (1 - 72) 2 (3.34)
In order to assure an interior solution to the problem, I make the following parametric
assumption:
2 (0 + o 2 + afd) > w (3.35)
2
This assumption assures that there are values of T2 such that the benefits from retaining all the
domestic endowment are lower than its cost in terms of variance of consumption. In particular,
when T2 = , the government increases welfare by rising taxes and reducing consumption risk.
It follows that the stable equilibrium corresponds to the positive root of (3.34) and the optimal
date-2 tax rate is positive but lower than the ex-ante best policy: T2 E [, 1].
As in the ex-ante optimal policy, the expected return on the domestic bonds is undetermined
as long as the budget constraint (3.13) is satisfied: R > 2 w. Finally, combining (3.27) and
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(3.14), the date-1 transfer to the residents is also lower than the ex-ante optimal policy:
T l W1 = -2 [ ( 2 + fd)] (3.36)
The equilibrium price for domestic bonds at date 1 takes into account the future optimal
government response. In other words, the price incorporates the future incentive of the gov-
ernment to decrease taxes and reduce payments to share holders. As a result, date-1 revenues
from selling the domestic bond are also reduced and so are the transfers to local agents. For
that reason, the time inconsistency of the government does not affect expected consumption of
residents or foreign investors. Moreover, the international risk diversification is not affected by
the suboptimal tax rate. Both foreign and resident investors adjust their demand for domestic
bonds according to the after-tax covariance matrix. Total exposure to aggregate risk coincides
with the first best allocation in (3.10) and (3.11).
However, the government distortion does have welfare implications. Residents' utility is still
given by U = (1 + i) u (cl), but the variance of consumption for residents is now higher than
in the first best allocation (3.12):
1 2Var (ci) = 4 (a2 + *2 + 2Ufd) + (1 - 'r2) 2 I
Because domestic bonds are also used to diversify the domestic idiosyncratic risk, residents face
an excessive volatility of consumption relative to the ex-ante optimal one. The incentive of the
government to expropriate foreign share holders has a negative impact on the domestic financial
system, which is unable to diversify the idiosyncratic endowment risk. The suboptimal tax rate
has no effect on foreign investors' welfare, which is still characterized by equation (3.11) and
(3.12).
These findings are summarized by the following proposition
Proposition 5 For a given    n date- domestic and foreign endowment wl, w*} and date-2 risky
endowment wis, ws} with distributions defined in (3.2) and (3.35), the policy equilibrium is
characterized by:
(i) Sub-optimal tax on risky local endowment: 2 E (, 1) with > O, > 0, and
lim,2,, r2 = 1
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(ii) Excessive volatility of local consumption:
cl = CE (ci,) = 1 wi + - w- 3.Var(cis)- (02 _ *2)}P .,2
where: Var(cis)=(-r 2 1 (2)2 2 2afd
(iii) Foreign agent's consumption at its first best level:
c = CE (c) -1 Var (cs)- (*2a2
where: Var (c)= (1 2 + a*2 + 2fd)
3.2.6 Commitment Device
The ex-ante optimal policy enables the financial market to replicate the first best allocation.
However, the government cannot credibly commit to follow it. This distortion arises because the
government prevails domestic interests over foreign ones and, if anticipated, ends up reducing
residents' welfare. The first best allocation will not be attained in this economy. Nevertheless,
the government can credibly commit to follow a superior policy by forcing residents to hold
domestic bonds above their individual optimal level. A Pareto better allocation is attained
if the government gives part of the date-1 transfer in the form of non-transferable individual
domestic-bond accounts.
From equation (3.33), the optimal date-2 tax rate increases with the holdings of domestic
bonds by the representative local agent. However, the portfolio of a single investor does not
affect government's incentives. That is, the individual optimum Bd in equation (3.26) does not
internalize its effect on government's incentives.1 Then, giving part of the initial transfer to
local investors in the form of domestic bonds is a Pareto improvement. Or, in other words, the
government uses date-i transfer to residents as a commitment device for a better policy in period
2. Needless to say, that policy will have an impact only if those accounts are nontransferable and
the amount transferred is above the privately chosen Bd in (3.26). Then, government's policy
is a vector P = {Bd,'1,r 2,Rs} e IR4 , where {Bd, T1} are chosen at date 1, while {72, R,} are
1This mechanism is in the lines of Tirole (2003): local investors exert externalities on each other through their
impact on the government's incentives.
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decided at date 2.
At date 1, the government chooses {Bd, Ti} that maximizes ex-ante residents' welfare,
taking into account its own ex-post incentives to impose a suboptimal tax rate -T2
max {u (c) + E (cis)}
{Bd,rl }
s.t.
{ B*, Pd, Pf} is a Financial Market Equilibrium for P = {Bd, l, r2 , Rs)
T2 = 1- (1 - Bd) - Y [Bdc2 + Bfd](337)
-Y [( -Bd- 2 +- a ]
Budget Constraints (3.13) and (3.14)
For a given P = {Bd, r1, 2, Rs} the financial market equilibrium is characterized by:
Pd = 3[- 22 (rd + 2)] + (Bd - Bd) y7 2 (1 p2) (3.38)
p - " )' (0"w 2 + fd)] (3.39)
Bf = - fd2 2 r2 d) (3.40)
where Bd is the privately optimum holding of domestic asset in (3.26), while Bd is the amount
transferred by the government. Foreign holdings of assets are Bd = 1 - d and B = 1 - Bf.
The transfer of domestic bonds to the local agents affects the price of the bonds in two
opposite ways. First, as expected, the policy increases their demand and, as a result, the
price rises with Bd -computed in the second term in (3.38). And second, because higher local
holdings of domestic bonds Bd result in a larger date-2 tax rate r 2, the variance of the return
on domestic bonds increases. This affects negatively the price of domestic bonds. Notice from
(3.39) that the price of foreign bonds is not affected by the local policy.
The existence of individual domestic-bond accounts also affects the demand for foreign
bonds, since the diversification strategy is altered (see (3.40)). The sign of this effect depends
on the sign of the covariance between foreign and domestic endowment risks.
The optimal date-1 transfer of domestic bonds is Bd that satisfies the following first order
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equation: [c d c 1 &T2 1aB[ f Bf YT 2 1 dcl [P d aPd T2
9Bd aT2 Bd Bf LBd T2 Pd laB Bd r 2 aBd 
Notice from (3.22), that .B corresponds to the first order condition for the individual
aBd
local agent, which is zero for Bd = Bd and negative for Bd > Bd. Also; since agents can
freely choose the amount of foreign bonds, it follows that f = foc(Bf) is equal to zero.
Finally, the ex-post optimal tax level -r2 satisfies the first order condition (3.32) and therefore:
act _/2 aVar(cis) -d) -
872 2 72 -
Replacing, the first order condition for Bd is:
foc (d) = f OCind (d) + 3 (1 - Rd) ^ /2 2 (1 p2)
+ ~ 2 + +
where focind (Bd) corresponds to the individual first order condition in (3.22), evaluated at the
government's optimum Bd and 0:2 > 0.2
aBd
It follows that the optimal Bd is larger than the private optimum Bd but allows some
international diversification: Bd E (Bd, 1).3 Since foreign investors still hold some domestic
bonds, the date-2 tax rate is bellow its first best level. The first best tax level (2 = 1) is
not optimal. From equation (3.37), that would require residents to hold the entire supply of
domestic bond (-Bd = 1). In that case, the idiosyncratic risk would be perfectly diversified, but
there would be suboptimal international risk sharing.
Summarizing, it is optimal for the government to impose private non-transferable savings
account composed of domestic bonds. By forcing residents to hold public bonds, the government
restricts itself from expropriating bond holders in the future and can credibly commit to follow a
Pareto better policy. This commitment device is costly: it results in a suboptimal international
2Replacing (3.40) in (3.37), follows that the ex-post optimal tax-rate is a function of Bd only: 2 =
1 - (1 Bd) 7 [( -B--) )2 ( 22) The tax rate 2 is a positive function of Bd: aB -
T2 -Bd2[) 1-p2 +(1- 2)? > 
(l-Bd ~ l-222)) 2(-p2)c2r 2
3 For Bd = Bd fo (d) = (1- Bd) [-2 (1 - p) + [ - (fd + )] , > 0
For d = 1: focind (d) = foc (d) < 0. It follows that Bd E (Bd, 1) -
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risk sharing. As a result, agents will face lower idiosyncratic risk but the first best allocation
will not be attained. The optimal restriction results from the trade-off between idiosyncratic
and aggregate risk diversification.
3.3 Dynamic Model
In this section I extend the baseline model to an infinitely repeated economy. Based on the
previous static framework, I develop an overlapping generation model with zero population
and economic growth. The government is an infinitely lived agent, who internalizes the future
benefits of implementing the ex-ante optimal policy.
I analyze the conditions under which "reputation" can work as a commitment device. In
those cases where it does, the government implements the ex-ante optimal policy under the
threat that any deviation will be punished by reversion to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Then, the economy attains its first best allocation. That is, residents diversify the domestic
idiosyncratic risk and minimize the aggregate risk by holding the international portfolio of
assets.
I characterize in this section the stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium and analyze the
cases in which the reversion to such equilibrium represents a sufficient threat.
3.3.1 Dynamic Environment
At each moment in time t = 1, 2, 3..., two generations coexist in the local economy: a unit mass
of young agents with endowment wl, who consume an amount cl,t; and a unit mass of old agents
with a random endowment wis,t, who consume ci,t. The state of the economy at each time t
is given by the old investors' assets and the government's storage of goods {Bt- 1, Btl, at-l},
where at corresponds to the government's investment in the storage technology, with a riskless
return (1 + r) .
As in the static framework, young and old residents at time t consume according to (3.41)
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and (3.42) respectively:
Cl,t + Bo,t + Bd,tPd,t + Bf,tpf,t = (1 - -l,t) wl (3.41)
cist = (1 - 72,t) Wis,t + Bo,t-l (1 + r) + Bd,t-lRs,t + Bf,t-lw*,t (3.42)
Similarly, young and old foreign investors at time t consume:
,t + Bot + Bd,tPd,t + Bf,tpf,t = wl + Pf,t (3.43)
Cs t = Ws,t + Bo,t_1 (1 + r) + Bd,t_-Rs,t + Bf,t-lWs, t (3.44)
Notice that the generation born at time t is affected by the policy actions {Tl,t,T2,t+1, Rs,t+l)}
Similar to the static case, the government has a period by period budget constraint. Differ-
ently, at each time t, government resources combine taxes levied to young and old agents, and
revenues from selling the domestic bond.
Rs,t + at > T2,tWst+ 7,t Wltl +Pd,t + at-1 (1 +r) (3.45)
at > 0
3.3.2 Financial Market Equilibrium
As in the static framework, the strategy of each local agent born at time t consists of three
actions 3t = {Bd,t, Bf,t, Bo,t} E R3+ -correspondingly, the strategy of a foreign investors is
3t = {Bd t, B,t, Bo, t E +-. The financial market equilibrium is defined for a given policy
path {Pt}tt, where Pt = {rl,t, r2,t, Rs,t, at}.
Definition 6 For a given policy path {Pt}t°_l such that for all t (3.45) is satisfied, a Financial
Market Equilibrium is a combination of strategies and market prices {Bct, L3t*, Pdt, Pf,t} such that:
(i) Bt = {Bd,t, Bf,t, Bo,t} maximizes u (ci,t) + 3Eu (cis,t+l) subject to (3.41) and (3.42)
(ii) Bt = {B,t B,t Bo,t maximizes u (c,t) + /uE (c,t+) subject to (3.43) and (3.44)
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(iii) Market clearing conditions are satisfied:
Bd,t +Bt = (3.46)
Bf,t +B,t = 1 (3.47)
As in the static framework, agents live for only two periods, so the financial market equi-
librium at each time t is analog to the static case:
______________ 1
Bd,t- 2r 2,t+ -1 2'r2,t+l ,t 22,t+ (3.48)
Bft= 2 f,t 2
Similarly, the equilibrium prices are:
Pit = /3 [* -2 (-*2 + aId)] (3.49)
Pd,t = [Rt+- 2T2,t+1l a + ad)] (3-50)
The existence of a storage technology assures that for each generation, the consumption
schedule satisfies (3.5). Then, replacing in the budget constraints (3.41) and (3.42), the con-
sumptior schedule for each generation born at time t is:
cit 1 { + W - : (a2 _ a*2) - Var (ci,t+1) + Tt}
cx 1 + 4 -T}2 (3.51)
where: Var (cis,t+) = (1 - 2,t+l 4 ( + a 2afd)
Tt = -,twl - /32,t+] [w - (a.2 + afd)]
cl,t = CE (cis,t+l) (3.52)
where CE(cis,t+l) denotes for the Certainty Equivalent of ci,t+l, and Tt is the net transfer
received by the generation born at time t. In the static framework, with only one generation
alive, the net transfer is necessarily zero. That is, the resources received when young are equal
to the discounted certainty equivalent of future tax payments (see equation (3.36)). This is not
necessarily the case in the dynamic framework.
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3.3.3 Ex-ante Optimal Policy
If local agents could sell their future endowment, the decentralized equilibrium would be a
repeated version of the static equilibrium presented in section 2.2. That is, prices would be
constant over time and each generation born at time t would have the same consumption
schedule and portfolio composition as in the decentralized equilibrium characterized by equa-
tions (3.6)-(3.12). As in the static framework, a credible government can replicate this first
best allocation for the case where agents cannot pledge their future endowment. The ex-ante
optimal policy is a path {'Pt}°°1 with Pt = {Tl,t, T2,t, Rs,t, at}) E R4 that maximizes
oo
max E - t-1u (cl,t) + Eu (cis,t+l)]
{ t=1 t=l
s.t.
Rs,t + at = Tr,tWl + 'r2,tWs,t + Pd,t + at-1 (1 + r) (3.53)
(3.50),(3.51), and (3.52)
The ex-ante optimal policy leads the economy towards the first best risk diversification. That
is, the idiosyncratic risk is diversified away and the aggregate risk is minimized:
Vt: 'r2,t = 1 (3.54)
Since the intertemporal preference is the reciprocal of the return on the riskless technology, the
utility is constant across generations:
u' (cl,t) = Eu' (ci,t) = u' (cl,t-l) (3.55)
Then, at any time t, the optimal transfer to the young agents is:
7T,tWi = -aor - [U-2 (u2 + Ufd)] (3.56)
where ao corresponds to the government's initial holdings of assets in storage. Then, the net
transfer to the young generation Tt = -lw, - [ - (o2 + f d)] is equal to the flow of
returns on government's assets: ar.
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Again, the level of expected return on the domestic asset Rt is undetermined, together with
the government's storage in the riskless technology, and does not affect agents' welfare:
Rt = (at- - ao) ( + r) + v (3.57)
At each period t, the government gets at-_ (1 + r) from its investment in the storage technology.
An amount (at - ao) (1 + r) is assigned to debt payments, ao-lr is transferred to the young,
and the remaining a-1_ is reinvested.
3.3.4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
A time inconsistent government cannot commit to follow the ex-ante optimal dynamic policy.
Instead, it has incentives to impose a suboptimal tax on old residents and, by doing so, it
prevents residents from fully diversifying the idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, in the dynamic
framework, a new distortion arises: a time inconsistent government has incentives to redistribute
resources across generations.
For each t, the timing of each stage-game is the following:
1. Local and foreign young agents choose strategies 3t = {Bd,t, Bf,t, Bo,t) E R3+ and B* =
{B* t B t, B* , t } E R3. The government implements a policy vector Pt = {7l,t, 2,t, Rs,t, at}
2. The aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are realized: {Wts ,t, Ei,tl) =0 .
3. Consumption takes place: {ct, {cis,t} o}
I characterize here the stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) for the dynamic game
described above. In this type of equilibria, strategies can only be contingent on the payoff-
relevant state of the world and the prior actions taken within the same period. The Markov
Perfect Equilibrium for this economy is defined as follows:
'Definition 7 For a given state {Bo, ao}, a stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a combi-
nation of strategies and market prices {Pt, Bt, Bt*,pd,t,pf,t} =l1 such that the three strategies are
best responses to the other three, and the asset markets clear. That is:
(i) for all t = 1, 2, 3..., {Bt, B, pd,t,pf,t is a Financial Market Equilibrium given {Ptt= 1
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(ii) for all t = 1, 2, 3..., Pt satisfies
W (3t-l, at-i) = max {u (c,t) + Eu (ci,t) + FEW (Pt, at)}
Pt
s.t.
(3.45), (3.41), and (3.42)
T
lim : t {Tl,tWl + 3T2,t [W- (2 + afd)] } + ao > O (3.58)
t=l
(iii) the allocation is stationary: for all t = 1, 2, 3... : cl,t = cl and E (Ci,,t) = E (cs)
The government has incentives to transfer resources from the old to the new generations.
For that reason, I restrict, in the limit, the budget constraint of the government. Condition
(3.58) requires that transfers to the young generation are financed out of taxes on residents or
initial government's savings. In other words, under condition (3.58) no bubble arises.
I guess the following equation for the government's future policy:
1 - BdRt+ = (at - ao) (1 + r) + /3 2,t+W + Bd (,tWl - -tWl) (1 + r) (3.59)
Combining (3.50) and (3.59), the resulting financial market equilibrium price for the do-
mestic bond is:
Pdt at -a + T2,t+ [w- 2 (o + jfd)] + [Tl,tWl- 7-'Wl] (3.60)
The optimal tax rate on the old residents' endowment is suboptimal relative to the ex-
ante optimum. Again, the tax rate corresponds to the optimal trade-off between variance and
expected consumption. The reaction function describing the optimal tax level T'2,t is identical
to the static one:
T2,t = 1 -(1 - Bd,t-) [B + ] (3.61)
Combining (3.48) a d(3[(1), the MPE tax level -Bd, holdings of domestic assets by residents
Combining (3.48) and (3.61), the MPE tax level and holdings of domestic assets by residents
are constant over time and identical to the static equilibrium in (3.34) and (3.26). For all
83
= 1,2, 3,..
2 (2 + fd)(3.62)T2,t = T2 : 2 (1-f 2 )= 2o + d) (3.62)
2~-2 -- 1Bd,t = Bd 22 -
2T2
The optimal transfer to young residents satisfies the following condition:
U' (cl,t) wl = Eu (is,t) Bd,t-1 [i + -9Tlj (3.63)
The first term in (3.63) corresponds to the marginal benefit of increasing the transfer to the
young, while the second term is its marginal cost in terms of reducing the payments to the
bond holders. Everything else constant, a unit of extra consumption to the young generation
implies a reduction in today's payments to the elderly. However, because this payments take
the form of returns on domestic bonds, this reduction only affects residents in a proportion
Bd,t-1, while the remaining (1 - Bd,t-1) affects foreign investors not taken into account in the
government's objective function. Then, if the price of future bonds did not react to current
transfer to the young generation, the government would have incentives to redistribute resources
from the elderly to the young above the ex-ante optimal.
In the stationary MPE, the price reaction in (3.60) exactly offsets government's incentives to
edistribute resources across generations and the level of utility is constant. A constant utility
over time together with a constant tax on old residents' endowment implies that for all t, the
tax on the young generation is also constant: l,twl = rlW1.
The price on domestic bonds increases with current tax burden on the young generations.
The intuition is simple: any increase in the transfer to young residents is permanent over time
and implies a reduction on future payments to domestic bond holders, which results in a lower
price. Notice that the incentives of the government to redistribute resources to the young
generation decreases in the share of domestic bonds held by residents. Indeed, in the limit of
Bd = 1, the price of the domestic bond does not react to current taxes and the government has
no incentives to further reduce payments.
From (3.58), the resulting MPE is characterized by a constant level of utility over time,
84
which requires constant transfers. The transfer to each young generation is given by the cer-
tainty equivalent of their future tax payments when old, and the flow of interest on the initial
government's savings:
Tl,tWl = TlW1 = -aOr - /T2 - (2 + Ufd)] (3.64)
Finally, replacing the optimal tax schedule on (3.59), the government's choice of expected
return on bonds is given by (3.59). Payments to bond holders are financed out of taxes on
old generation's endowment and out of government's return on savings. At each period t, gov-
ernment's revenues from its investment in the storage technology are at-_ (1 + r). An amount
(at - ao) (1 + r) is assigned to debt payments, aolr is transferred to the young, and the remain-
ing a0-1 is reinvested. The MPE expected return on domestic bonds is again undetermined,
together with the optimal level of government's storage, and does not affect agents' utility but
only the price level.
Rt = (at-_ - ao) (1 + r) + T2W (3.65)
Welfare value for the government is only affected by its initial wealth and the endowment
distribution:
2(toi atol) = u (C) (1 -/
where:
cl = 1 w [ + + aor -/ 4 (2 _*2) -/ Var (cis)]
1L4 4 2
2 1Var (ci) = (1- 2) 2 + 1 (f + 2+ 2 f
These findings are summarized as follows:
Proposition 6 For a given domestic and foreign endowment {wl, w*, wi, w*} with distribu-
tions defined in (3.2) and (3.35), the policy (stationary Markov Perfect) equilibrium is charac-
terized by:
(i) Sub-optimal tax on risky local endowment: 2 C (, 1) with > 0, and
lim2_,, T2 = 1
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(ii) Excessive volatility of local consumption:
2 1where: Var (c8) = (1- T2) 2 +a 1 + x*2 +20fd)
(iii) Foreign agent's consumption at its first best level:
c = CE (cs) = 1 {w l + * -/3 Var (cS) - 3 (*2 _ 2)
where: Var (cs) = I (a2 + 7*2 + 2fd)
(iv) Price for domestic bonds reacts negatively to current transfers to the young generation:
&Pd,t _ 1-Bd < 0
J(-71 w) Bd
3.3.5 Equilibrium with Reputation
I analyze in this section the conditions under which reputation can work as a commitment
device. Here, I allow strategies to be contingent not only on actions taken within the same
period, but also on the history of strategies. The optimal policy rule that the government car
credibly commit to follow is given by the following program:
00
max E A [u (Cl,t) + PE (cs St+l)]
(tP),0 t=0-O
s.t.
Rs,t + at = Tl,tWl + T2,tWs,t + Pd,t + at-1 (1 + r)
(3.50), (3.48), (3.51), and (3.52)
Vt:W( Bt-l,at-, {P't, } I {PtJ1) > W (t-l,at-, {'Pt;} l{ IP
The policy rule {Pt,}t' maximizes the ex-ante welfare subject to {B3t, 3 ,Pd,t,Pf,t being a
financial market equilibrium for every t, given the history of government's policy {Pt, }-l'. And,
at each moment t, the incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. That is, the government
has incentives to follow the promised rule {Pt)t instead of implementing the MPE policy
i7P, }i .The reversion to the Markov Perfect EquiiibriuI. is used as a threat to sustain the
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ex-ante policy rule. The ability to commit depends on the instantaneous gains from deviating
from the promised rule, versus the cost in terms of a suboptimal policy thereafter. Then, if
the reversion to the MPE does not represent a sufficient threat, reputation cannot constitute a
commitment technology.
The ex-ante optimal policy rule is {Pt, }t such that Pt = {Tl,t, T2,t, ,t, at} satisfies (3.54)-
(3.57). So, if the government follows the ex-ante optimal rule, residents' portfolio is, in equilib-
rium, BF = {B, BF, Bf } such that:
BF BF 1
BF : cit = E (cis,t+l)
The welfare value for the government if following the rule is:
W (Btl,atl, {Pt,'}t{Pt,} I 1 u(c F) 1 
where:
cl = 1 +-- [w + w + aor- 3 Var (CF)- _*2) (3.66)
Var (ciFs) (a2 + a2 + 2afd)
If the government abandons the rule, it succeeds in surprising the market for one period.
After that, the economy goes back to its Markov Perfect Equilibrium described previously. In
that case, welfare value for the government is:
W tD-1, atDl, {P }t {Pt,}D) = max {u (Cl,t) + E (i,t) + EW (Bt, at)}
s.t.
(3.60), (3.48), (3.51), and (3.52)
{BtD-1, atD-1} correspond to 3F, aF
T
lim E ,3t-tD {TltWl + /-2,t [W- 2 + ad)] } + aD > 0
t=tD+l1
where tD is the time of abandoning the rule, and aD corresponds to government's asset at that
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:ime.
When residents expect the government to follow the rule, their holdings of domestic bonds
are larger thar. in the MPE (B F > Bd). Therefore, at the time of deviating, the optimal tax
rate is higher than the MPE tax rate in (3.62). In other words, since residents' exposure to
domestic risk is above the MPE levels, the government implements a tax rate rD higher than
the MPE tax rate -2:
t = tD: T2,t = 7D = 1- 2 ( + Old) (3.67)
Residents adjust their holdings of bonds as soon as the government deviates from the
promised rule. From then on, both the tax rate and the portfolio choice are consistent with the
MPE described above:
t > tD 'T2,t 2 < 72
2'2 - 1t > tD:Bd,t = 2Br2
where 2 corresponds t the MPE tax rate in equation (3.62)).
Deviating from the rule is not neutral over generations. The immediate gains from surpris-
-ng the market will be spread over time but still, the initial old generation will be the most
benefited from the departure. As before, the government has incentives to redistribute in favor
of the young: increasing the transfer (-T-lwl) implies a one-to-one increase in young residents'
consumption and a reduction of only B F in old residents'. However, the negative reaction of
the price level more than offsets this effect. From equation (3.60)), the price of domestic bonds
at the time of deviation decreases in 1-Bd for every dollar transferred to the young. Because
;he price reflects the future performance of the domestic bond, its elasticity towards current
transfer depends on Bd, the future holdings of the asset, which is lower than its current level,
BF. Therefore, the optimal transfer (-T,tWl) to the young generation satisfies the following
condition:
BF
t = tD U' (Cl,t) = Eu' (ci ,,t (3.68)
t D () 
t > tD V,." (cl,t)'= .E, (oi,t)
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The resulting payment to bond holders is:
t = tD: Rt = (aF- aD)(1 + r) + DT (3.69)
t > tD: Rt = (at_ - aD) (1 + r) + 2w
At the time of abandoning the rule, the government succeeds in surprising the financial
market. It does so by deviating from the promised tax r2 and by altering the amount of
government's savings designated to pay its debt. The government transfers aDr to the young
(different from aor under the rule), and assigns (aF - aD) (1 + r) to debt payments instead of
(aF - ao) (1 + r) committed under the rule.
The welfare value of the government if deviating is:
W (3t-i, at-, {P } {Pt}.to = u( [(1 | (1 _ .2)] (3.70)
where:
C 1 [wl + X + aDr -O' r (a- -*2) ' Y Var (s)] (3.71)
Var (ci,) = (1 - T2)2 + (a2 + + 2)
where aD is defined implicitly by (3.68), (3.71) and (3.69).
The instantaneous benefit from deviating can be observed in the second term in (3.70).
Part of the gains from expropriating bond holders is shared with future generations, who are
the beneficiaries of the flows of interests on aD, as can be observed in (3.71). However, future
generations will be jeopardized with suboptimal diversification of idiosyncratic risk.
The ability to commit to the ex-ante rule depends on the instantaneous gains from surprising
the market, versus the cost in terms of a suboptimal policy thereafter. As expected, reputation
works as a commitment technology if the intertemporal discount is sufficiently high (see figure
1.a.). In the limit of 13 = 1 (or equivalently r = 0), government's flow of return on aD has no
effect on consumption (liml1 aDr = 0). It follows that the limfi 1 cl < cF and therefore:
W (Bt.i, at-,, {fpt' I t 1) U (C1)
lim1 W >1
w~~ >
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Figure l.a
More interesting, reputation is less likely to support the ex-ante rule in economies with high
idiosyncratic risk. When the idiosyncratic risk is higher, the government implements a policy
closer to the ex-ante optimal after abandoning the rule. Then, the reversion to the Markov
Perfect Equilibrium does not represent a sufficient threat. Indeed, the higher is c, the larger
is the tax rate on the risky endowment (r2) and residents' holding of domestic bond (Bd). The
improvement in the optimal policy more than compensates the increase in the idiosyncratic risk
and residents end up facing a lower variance of consumption:
War (cia) -[(-r 2) (o] (1- T2)2
0oa 0a<2 (2T2 - 1)
'Then, if the government is indifferent between following the rule or deviating, an increase in
';he idiosyncratic risk will make the rule less attractive. 4 Figure 2.b. shows the case where
such point of indifference exists, contrary to Figure 2.a. where pre-commitment is possible for
all values of uo.
In the limit of infinite idiosyncratic variance, the optimal policy without commitment tech-
4 If a point of indifference exists. At that point, the direct effect of an increase in the idiosyncratic risk (keeping
aD constant) on the welfare value after abandoning the rule is:
&W (Bti at,{g}7t| }to) - 2 1 p 2 2 1 Bd (1 r)2 1
.h;Iich is positive for > 0.5. Making aD endogenous can only increase the welfare value even further
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nology coincides with the ex-ante optimal. As a result; the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied with equality, as shown in Figure 2.a and 2.b..
W(Bt_-,at-j,{PtI{IPt'} ) 1
li r a
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1.04|
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Figure 2.a. Figure 2.b
These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 The threat of a reversion to the stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium can
sustain the ex-ante optimal policy if
(l ( ) > u (cl) - - t2) (3.72)
where cF is defined as in (3.66), c as in (3.71), and a is implicitly given by (3.68).
At a point where (3.72) is satisfied with equality, a higher , increases the cost of the reversion
to the stationary MPE, while a rise in o- reduces it.
Summarizing, when the idiosyncratic risk is high, reputation is less lickely to work as a
commitment device for the implementation of the ex-ante optimal policy and the economy will
not attain the first best allocation. Along the same lines, transfer to young residents in the form
of domestic bonds improves fiscal policy. But, as a downside, they reduce the effectiveness of
the reversion to the Markov Perfect Equilibrium as a threat and may deprive the government
from a costless commitment technology.
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3.4 Conclusions
Fiscal policy plays a double role in Lerms of risk diversification: government's bonds are used
for international risk sharing, while taxes are key to pool domestic idiosyncratic risk. If the
government can pre-commit to follow the ex-ante optimal policy, there is no trade-off between
these two roles. The ex-ante optimal fiscal policy succeeds in perfectly diversifying domestic
Idiosyncratic risk and local investors minimize their exposure to aggregate risk by holding the
optimal international portfolio.
However, when the policymaker lacks the ability to commit, there is a tension between
pooling idiosyncratic risk and holding a diversified interantional portfolio. If a large proportion
of government debt is held by domestic investors, the government, who prevails local interests
over foreign ones, will be able to commit to a higher return on its debt. On the other hand,
whenever foreign investors hold government bonds, the fiscal policy will be suboptimal, and the
domestic idiosyncratic risk will not be perfectly diversified.
This result provides a rationality for restricting the portfolio choice of pension funds, with
minimum requirements of government bonds. This restriction results in a superior fiscal pol-
icy and better diversification of the idiosyncratic risk. However, as a downside, it implies a
cuboptimal international risk sharing. Moreover, these restrictions reduce the effectiveness of
reputation as a commitment device for implementing the ex-ante best policy.
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Chapter 4
Investor Protection and Domestic
Participation in the Financial
Market
4.1 Introduction
The quality of countries' institutions governing financial markets has a strong impact on the
ability of those economies to attract investment. Despite the breath of evidence documenting
this fact,1 and the broad consensus on the need of increasing investor protection and the overall
quality of the institutional environment in which financial transactions occur, the question of
why inefficient institutions exist in the first place has not been resolved.2
One way of formalizing weak institutions is to assume that governments cannot commit to
policies. Instead, only policies that are ex-post optimal can be credibly implemented. As a
result, emerging markets must function in poor institutional environments, face high sovereign
risk, and must resort to very costly commitment devices that are sub-optimal from an ex-ante
'For a review of theoretical and empirical research on the link between law, financial developtment and
investment, see Beck et al. (2000, 2004) and Levine (2004).
2La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find that the level of financial develpment varies signifiatively across countries.
La Porta et al. (1997) stress that historically-determined differences in legal tradition shape the laws governing
financial transactions. Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) focus on how political economy
forces shape national policies.
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perspective. This paper looks at how the government's lack of commitment technology affects
policy decisions towards investor protection -i.e. bankruptcy laws, In particular, it shows that
the interaction between wealth distribution and international integration will affect investor
protection and, consequently, the domestic level of investment.
The government's objective function weights agents' utilities independently of their wealth.
The optimal level of investor protection depends on the number of financiers relative to en-
trepreneurs affected by the policy. If the capital account is closed, the incentives to impose a
superior level of investor protection are higher in economies with an even income distribution.
In unequal economies, the supply of investment funds will be concentrated among a small group
of wealthy investors with low weight in the government's objective function. In that case, the
number of financiers relative to entrepreneurs is low and the government has incentives to ben-
efit the later, which, from an ex-post perspective, implies a reduction in investor protection.
Those economies will be characterized by low level of investment.
When the capital account is open, this conclusion may be reversed. In economies with
low income per capita, foreign capital inflows crowd out local investors. In poor but equally
distributed economies, lenders are mainly foreign. The government, who does not consider
foreigners in its objective function, will reduce investor protection in an attempt to redistribute
resources from foreign lenders to local borrowers. In poor economies, the number of resident
financiers increases if there is at least a small share of wealthy investors able to compete with
foreign lenders in the local market. Therefore, investor protection will be higher in unequal
economies.
On the other hand, in rich economies, income per capita is high enough so the average local
investor finds it optimal to participate in the financial market. Therefore, the number of local
participants and the optimal level of investor protection are higher in economies with an even
wealth distribution. Moreover, in rich economies, with large domestic financial markets, the
proportion of foreign to domestic capital is low. As a result, the government will have incentives
to maintain high level of investor protection after the capital account liberalization. The gains
from integrating the financial system are larger in this case.
The predictions of this model are consistent with some stylized facts concerning the in-
t-~utions gove:ning financial markets. First, as shown in Figure 41, high income countrieElutions gove-ming f nancial markets n~~,·
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have a more liberalized financial market. Second, as represented in Figure 4-2, in economies
with low income per capita, unequal distribution -i.e. high Gini coefficient- is correlated with
higher financial liberalization. However, that pattern is reversed for high income economies,
were economies with low Gini coefficient tend to show higher levels of financial liberalization. 3
cn _5 -
.14
V
r 
0-
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
year
low income - high income
Source: Index of financial iberalization from Abiad and Mody (2003): 0-17 where 17 corresponds to the
maximum level of financial liberalization. GDP per capita from WDI
Note: The threshold for low and high income countries corresponds to the simple average of income per.
capita in 1974.
Low income countries are: Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Morocco, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Zimbabwe.
High income countries are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, France, Korea, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, South Africa, and Venezuela.
Figure 4-1: Financial Liberalization and Income Level
The model developed in this paper has three building blocks. First, investors and entrepre-
neurs share risk in a small open economy subject to a productivity shock. I simplify the analysis
by assuming that investors are risk averse and entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Entrepreneurs
can therefore provide some insurance to investors, up to the limit imposed by the return on
productive projects. That is, the efficient credit arrangement minimizes entrepreneurs' con-
3The index of financial liberalization presented in these figures was developed by Abiad and Mody (2003) and
accounts for regulation, investor protection, and financial integration.
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Figure 4-2: Financial Liberalization and Income Distribution
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sumption in the low-productivity state. However, credit contracts promise a non-contingent
payment, which is only going to be honored in the non-defaulting state. In bad realization of
the productivity shock, the payment to the financiers depends on the bankruptcy law imposed
by the government. Or, in other words, the insurance component of credit contracts is medi-
ated by government's policy. Higher level of investor protection increases the capacity of the
entrepreneurs to provide insurance and boost aggregate investment.
Second, there is an access cost to the domestic financial system. This is to account for the
fact that in emerging economies there is a share of the population that does not participate
in formal credit transactions. Then, income distribution will determine the number and the
average wealth of those who participate. If the financial market is closed to international
transactions, the expected return on the loans that clears the market will be high enough so
that local investors participate. If the capital account is open, this need not be the case. The
expected return that clears the market may low such that local investors do not find it optimal
to pay the access cost. In that case, most of the financing is provided by foreign investors.
Finally, the government lacks the ability to commit to the ex-ante optimal policy. Instead,
it will be tempted to use investor protection laws as a tool for redistribution between borrowers
and lenders. Government's objective function weights individual utilities independently of their
wealth. Therefore, for the same investment level, the policy will be different depending on the
number of local investors participating in the financial market.
This model builds on the literature on the political economy of finance, where the influence
of private interests affects financial development. As Rajan and Zingales (2003), I emphasize
the influence of incumbent interests (entrepreneurs and financiers in the financial system) on the
institutional differences across countries. Here, incumbents do not affect the political outcome
through lobby or economic interest groups: Instead, the government maximizes entrepreneurs
and financiers' welfare independently of their wealth. The model in this paper is also related to
Tirole (2003). As in there, I relate government's moral hazard and access to international capital
markets to the quality of the institutions governing financial markets. Moreover, I interact these
features with country specific characteristics such as wealth level and distribution. I find that
these characteristics play a key role in determining the effect of openness on the level of investor
protection.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic environ-
ment. Section 3 solves the credit market equilibrium with closed capital account for a given
government's policy. Section 4 endogenizes the level of investor protection. Section 5 solves the
credit market equilibrium after opening the capital account and the following section closes the
model endogenizing the level of investor protection in the integrated financial market. Section
6 concludes.
-4.2 Environment
The model describes a 2-period small economy populated by a large number of investors and
entrepreneurs. Consumption takes place at date 2. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral with expected
utility E (cE). Consumers/investors have risk averse preferences over date 2-consumption:
u (c)= -n (cC) (4.1)
They are characterized by their initial wealth Wi : U [W, W].
Entrepreneurs have no initial resources and, at date 1, have access to two technologies:
either they home-produce an amount kj units of goods at time 2, or they can undertake a risky
project. The return of the home-production is distributed uniformly across entrepreneurs:
kj: U [0, 1]
The risky project requires a unit of initial investment and has a random return Rs at date 2,
which follows the aggregate state of the economy s C {L, H}. Productivity follows a symmetric
binomial distribution:
R, = RL, RH}
Pr = 1/2
Debt contracts are set at date 1, before the productivity shock is realized. The contract
with domestic firms specifies a date 2 repayment (P). In case of default, there is a share a of
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project's revenues that goes to the financier, while the rest is held by the entrepreneur. The
parameter co can be interpreted generally as bankruptcy laws. It is going to be endogenized in
section 4. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral, so their utility is given by:
E kj if home-production (4.2)
E (cs) R (4:2)
E (R - N) if risky project
where : N = min{aRs, P}
Entrepreneurs' strategy consists of a single binary variable choice: participate or not in the
risky project. A risk neutral entrepreneur will undertake the project if its expected return is
higher than the home-production's. That is, all entrepreneurs with kj < k* will require finance
for the investment project, where k* is defined as:
k* = E (RS - N) (4.3)
I assume now (and check the conditions later) that aRL < P < aRH. Then: NL = aRL and
NH =P
At date 1, consumers can invest in the domestic risky project through the domestic financial
market, or storage with zero net return.- There is a fixed cost r to access the financial market.
This is to capture for the fact that, in emerging economies, there is an 'important share of the
population that does not have access to the financial sector. Storage, on the other hand, does
not involve any cost.
The strategy of each investor with Wi consists of a variable pi, the share of wealth invested
in domestic projects, that maximizes expected utility (??):
maxEu (ce)
s.t.
ci = [uiNs + (1 -z)] [Wi -1 ( > 0) ] (4.4)
The access cost to the financial market is only paid if the investor has positive amount of
these assets, which is illustrated by the indicator function 1 (.). .
99
4.3 Credit Market Equilibrium
The credit market equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 8 For given parameters {oar,) the credit market equilibrium is a vector
{k*, {,i}w, P} such that:
i) For a given P, k* satisfies the free entry condition (4.3)
ii) For a given P, each investor with Wi E [W, W] chooses [Li that maximizes (4.1) subject
to (4.4)
iii) P is such that the credit market clears:
k* = p (Wi - ) f (Wi) dWi
The strategy that maximizes (4.1) subject to (4.4) is the following: all consumers with
Wi < W* will find it optimum not to participate in the financial market Pi = 0 (see Figure
4-3). For those with wealth higher than W* the optimal investment in the risky project is a
constant share i = ,u of their wealth, where W* and A satisfy the following:
(P-1)-(-aRL) (45)
2 (P - 1) (1 - cYRL)
in (W* ) =Eln (ANs + (1-u)) (4.6)
The market clears when credit contracts stipulate P (the payment in the non-defaulting
state) such that the demand of investment funds k* equals the supply, which is given by the
share j. of the portfolio lent to entrepreneurs and the size of the financial market WFM:
k*= -WFM (4.7)
where : WFM = E (W - TIW > W*) Pr (W > W*) (4.8)
The level of investment increases in a, the share of production that corresponds to the
financiers in case of default. The intuition is simple. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral while
financiers are risk averse. Therefore, in a frictionless economy, the optimal credit contract
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rFigure 4-3: Utility of participants and non-participants in the financial market
would minimize entrepreneurs' consumption in the bad state so to provide the maximum level
of insurance to the investors. Here, debt contracts stipulate a non-contingent payment P. The
payment to the financiers in case of default depends on a. Therefore, a large a improves the
insurance component of the credit arrangements and brings the economy closer to its first best
allocation.
Indeed, a larger a increases the payments to the financiers in the low productivity state.
And, because investors are risk averse, they value the return in the bad state more than in
the good one. Therefore, if a is larger, they are willing to accept lower expected return from
the loan. That is, the level of P required to keep p constant decreases in aRL more than
proportionally:
= -RL (P )2 < -RL (4.9)
a (1 - aRL)2
Entrepreneurs, on the other side, maximize expected profits which only depends on their ex-
pected payments to the financiers:
= -RL kF-(4.10)
Oa k*=k*
There is an additional effect of ac on the supply of investment funds. Because changes in
a and P affect the expected utility of those agents who participate in the domestic financial
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Figure 4-4: Investment level and a
system, an increase in a also has an impact in WFM. The effect of a on the size of the
financial market is ambiguous, however, it can never be the case that the change in WFM
totally compensates the mentioned effect of a on k* and /.4
Figure 4-4 illustrates the schedules (P, a) such that the demand (k*) and the supply (WFM)
of investment funds are constant. Any point above the schedule (P, a) IWFM= WF_ is charac-
terized by higher supply, while any point above the schedule (P, a) k*=-k corresponds to lower
demand of investment funds. The equilibrium lays between the two curves: as a increases the
expected payment E (Ns) decreases and, therefore, aggregate investment is higher.
The existence of the entry cost T makes wealth distribution relevant when analyzing aggre-
gate investment level. I define w = W - E (W) = E (W) - W. Then, the direct effect of a
4To see this, suppose that an increase in c did not provoke a rise in the level of investment (k*). Then, the
schedule (P, a) would be characterized by equation (4.10). However, if that was the case, the utility of those
who participate in the financial sector would unambiguously increase in a:
dEu (cSI[ > ) | yRL 1 _ 1 >0
dc _k-= 2 1 -i (1- RL) 1 + / (P- 1)
In that case, the number of participants in the financial market should increase -i.e. dW ' < 0- and
therefore, there should be an excess of supply of investment funds, which is a contradiction.
Concluding: even if the number of participants in the financial market decreases with a, it has to be that
ap < a ik*=S r ' This implies that the equilibrium investment level rises in cr.
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mean preserving spread on the size of the financial market is the following:
aWFM 1 E (W) 2 - W*2
OW =4k Vw2 J
aWFM aWFM 1lim,,o -o limw-, w -4
aw aw 4
When wealth distribution is perfectly even (w = 0), P is such that all of investors participate
in the financial market: Vi : Wi = W > W*. The size of the market attains its maximum in
that case and any mean preserving spread reduces investment. On the other hand, when the
wealth distribution is very uneven, only the wealthiest participate. A mean preserving spread,
in that case, increases the size of the financial market because the expected wealth of those rich
enough to participate increases.
Following the effect of w on WFM, the relation between w and the level of investment is
ambiguous, and depends on the initial wealth distribution, as can be observed in Figure 4-5.
The figure shows two credit market equilibria: in the one that corresponds to a low inequality
(wL), a mean preserving spread reduces the investment level; in the one that corresponds to
high inequality (wH) a further increase in w increases investment.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
103
Proposition 8 For a given set of parameters {c, r), the Credit Market Equilibrium is char-
acterized by
i) All investors with Wi > W* lend a share , > O. Investors with Wi < W* choose t = O.
ii) All entrepreneurs with kj < k* demand finance. Entrepreneurs with kj > k* choose
home-production
iii) An increase in c increases the level of investment:
Ok*
>0O
iv) Investment decreases in w if the original distribution is even. The opposite occurs with
original uneven distribution:
Ok* Ok*lim -< 0 lim -> 0
w-*o dw w-od dw
v) The number of participants and the size of the financial sector attain their maximum
when w = 0:
0 = argmax WFM W > W* (w = O)
4.4 Policy Equilibrium
The government impacts the financial market by affecting the environment in which credit
contracts are set. I assume that the government can choose the level of investor protection ca,
for example, by modifying bankruptcy laws. This is in line with Tirole (2003), where private
credit agreements depend both on the parties involved in the arrangement and the government,
with whom investors and entrepreneurs do not contract.
The government chooses o (the share of the project's revenues that corresponds to the fi-
nancier in case of default) after credit contracts are set. That is, the government lacks the
ability to commit and can only credibly implement the ex-post optimal policy. The ex-post op-
timal policy feeds back into date-1 expectations and Credit Market Equilibrium. Entrepreneurs
and investors set their credit contracts accordingly.
The equilibrium is defined as follows:
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Definition 9 Given a set of parameters {T, 0, the Policy Equilibrium is a vector
{c, k, {fp}2, P} such that:
i) { k*, {i }w, P} is a Credit Market Equilibrium given or
ii) oc maximizes government's welfare function given {k*, {/iW}, p}-
W 1
max 0 J Eu(ciCs) f(Wi)dWi + (1-O) j E(c )f(kj)dkj
caE[0,1]
s.t.
(4.2), (4.4)
where 0 and (1 - ) correspond to the weights the government assigns to consumers and entre-
preneurs respectively.
Combining (4.4), (4.6), (4.2), and (4.3), the welfare of consumers and entrepreneurs are
given by:
Eu (cC) dWi= Eu (Wi) f (Wi) dWi + Eu (p, (Wi - )) f (Wi) dWi
where : Ps = GIN, + (1 - /)
I EF(c4) dkj = E () dkj + kf (kj) dkj
Taking P, k* and W* as given, the optimal E [0,1] satisfies the following first order
condition:
foc (c) : 0 8 Pr (Wi > W*) -- (1-I) Pr (kj < k*) = (4.11)
PL
As expected, the higher is 0, the larger is the optimal c. As discussed in the previous section,
a larger or increases the equilibrium investment level. In other words, aggregate investment will
be higher, the larger the weight the government assigns to investors in its objective function.
The Policy Equilibrium is represented in Figure 4-6. Different foreseen policies imply differ-
ent Credit Market Equilibria {k*, {iwiJ -, P}, which determines an ex-post government's policy
a. The rational expectation equilibrium corresponds to the intersection with the 45 degree line,
in which the foreseen ac is equal to the ex-post optimal.
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eforeseen a
Figure 4-6: Policy Equilibrium
The government weights investors and entrepreneurs' utilities independently of their wealth.
Then, the optimal policy a depends on the number of investors to entrepreneurs participating
in the financial market. Since the number of investors and the level of investment change with
the wealth distribution, so is the optimal a. Indeed, combining (4.11) with (4.7) and (4.8), the
optimal policy a decreases in w :
a = 0 2 ({ 1- [E (W)+ w + W*] (1- )} i (4.12)
As explained in the previous section, the number of consumers participating in the financial
market attains its maximum when the wealth distribution is perfectly even w = 0. Correspond-
ingly, the equilibrium policy a also attains its maximum in that case (see equation (4.12)).
An increase in w reduces the ratio of investors to entrepreneurs. The intuition is simple. A
mean preserving spread reduces the participation of the least wealthy investors and increases
the resources of those rich enough to remain. In other words, it results in wealthier, but fewer,
investors financing productive projects. The ratio of financiers to entrepreneurs decreases and
she government finds it optimal to favor the later, which, from a date-2 perspective, implies in
a lower a.
':hese findings are summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 9 In equilibrium, the policy a decreases in w:
lim < 0
w-+O 0w
4.5 Open Financial Market
This section analyzes the effects of opening the financial market. Local investors are now
able to invest abroad on a risk free asset with a return higher than the storage asset: r > 1.
Respectively, foreign investors are allowed to invest in local projects. Again, the access cost
to the financial market is a parameter . For simplicity, I assume there is no extra cost to
access to the international financial market. Those consumers who pay T participate in the
internationally integrated financial market. Otherwise, they invest in the storage asset. The
credit market equilibrium is now defined as follows:
Definition 10 For given parameters {a,,r the credit market equilibrium is a vector
{k,{ Hi } ,P, Pf} such that:
i) For a given P, k satisfies the free entry condition (4.3)
ii) For a given P, each local investor with Wi E [W, W] chooses pi that maximizes (4.1)
subject to
cs 1 (i > O) [iNs + (1 - i) r] [Wi - ] + [1 1 (i > 0)] Wi (4.13)
iii) For a given P, each foreign investor with W = Wf chooses /f that maximizes (4.1)
subject to
c = [fNs + (1 - Lf) r] [Wf - ]
iv) P is such that the credit market clears:
W
k* = i (Wi - ) dW + f (W - )
The strategy that maximizes (4.1) subject to (4.13) is the following: all investors with
Wi < W will find it optimum not to participate in the financial market. For those with
Wi > W* the optimal investment in the risky project is a constant share Hi = /,% of their
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wealth, where W* and [O satisfy the following:
(P - r) -(r - aRL)
2 (P - r) (r - RL)
In ( -) = E In (N~ + ( - r) (4.15)
The share invested in domestic projects is invariant to wealth level. Therefore, foreign
investors' portfolio choice is identical to the local investors': Pf = p.
The market clears when the credit contracts stipulate P (the payment in the non-defaulting
state) such that the demand of investment funds k* equals the supply, which is given by the
share , of the portfolio invested in the risky project and the size of the financial market WFM:
ko = IWFM (4.16)
where : WFM = E (W - IW > W*) Pr (W > Wo ) + (f - ) (4.17)
Notice that the size of the financial market is unambiguously larger when foreign investors
are allowed to participate. For that reason, the equilibrium expected return on the domestic
loans is lower than in the closed economy described before:
aP 2, (P-r) 2
=f (P - 2 W <0 (4.18)
awf (P- r)2 + WFMA
The effect of openness on the number of local investors is ambiguous. On one hand, gaining
access to the international market provides the opportunity of investing in a superior riskless
asset. Indeed, the international asset has a certain return r > 1, superior to the storage
aw*
technology and, from equation (4.15): -_ < 0. But, on the other hand, according to equation
'4.18), the entry of foreign investors lowers the return on domestic risky assets and therefore
-educes the attractiveness of participating. Figure 4-7 illustrates this trade-off. When the
international interest rate is high, local investors will profit from opening the market. The
zcntrary occurs if the international interest rate is low. Similarly, if the capital inflows are
:,egligible, the negative effect on P is small. In that case, local investors are unambiguously
:?tter off after opening the financial market and increase their participation.
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Figure 4-7: Utility of participants and non-participants in the financial market.
The reciprocal characterizes the level of investment: it decreases in the international r and
increases with the size of the capital inflows. A larger international interest rate reduces the
share of portfolio dedicated to loans:
'Oto (P - r)2 + (r - CtRL)2
dr 2 (P - r)2 (r - RL)2
And, if capital inflows are important, the equilibrium payment P is lower and investment level
is therefore larger (see equation (4.18)). The relation between the size of foreign capital inflows
and investment is represented in Figure 4-8. The level of investment increases after opening the
financial market if foreign capital inflows are large and the return on the international riskless
asset is low.
lim W* < W* lim ko < k*
wf-o wl-0
lim W > W* lim k > k *r-- - r --1
where W* and k correspond to the open financial market, while W* and k* to the closed
economy.
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Figure 4-8: Investment and foreign capital inflows
The effect of domestic wealth distribution on investment depends crucially on the level of
domestic wealth relative to foreign capital inflows.
T1VFM 1( E (W)2 -W*2
IO 4 W2
where w - 1/2 (W - W) .
When foreign capital inflows are small relative to the size of the domestic market, the
-;).ationship between wealth distribution and investment is similar to the closed credit market
equilibrium characterized in proposition 1: the maximum participation in the financial market
s attained when wealth distribution is even.
On the other hand, if the inflows of foreign capital are relatively large, the proportion of
local investors that participate in the financial market is larger in unequal societies.
To understand the intuition, it is better to focus in the limit case of equal domestic wealth
distribution · i : Wi = E (W). In the closed economy, the equilibrium payment P is such that
a11 of local investors participate: W* < E (W). Then, for a given average domestic wealth,
the financial market attains its maximum size in the limit of equal wealth distribution. In
an open economy, the equilibrium P does not guarantee the participation of local investors in
`he financial market. In fact, f a poor economy receives large capital nfiows, the equilibrium
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Figure 4-9: Investment and wealth distribution in an open economy
payment P may drop so that no local investor participates in the financial system: Wo' > E (W).
In this case, from equation (4.19), the number of local investors increases in w.
a Pr (W > W) W -E (W) (4.19)
Ow 2w2
If local wealth is low so that Wo > E (W), wealth inequality implies that there is at least
a group of rich local agents are able to compete with foreign investors in the financial market.
In that case, aggregate investment, local participation, and the size of the financial market
increase in w.
This example is illustrated in Figure 4-9. A mean preserving spread increases the size of
the financial market. Therefore, the schedule (P,w) I)WFM= WFM is downward slopping: if w
increases, a constant supply of investment funds requires a lower P. The equilibrium investment
level lays between the two curves, and increases with w.
Finally, as in the closed economy, the level of investment increases in ca.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 For a given set of parameters {a, rT}, the Credit Market Equilibrium is char-
acterized by:
111
i) All investors with Wi > W,* participate in the financial market.
lir W < W* lim W > W*
ii) All entrepreneurs with kj < ko demand finance. Entrepreneurs with kj > k* choose
home-production.
lir k < k* lim k > k*
Wf-0 r--1 
iii) If E (Wi) > WO*, w decreases investment if the original distribution is very even, and
increases otherwise:
lim ° < lim > 
w-lo aw w-o dw
iv) If E (Wi) < W,*, investment increases in w for all original wealth distribution.
4.6 Policy Equilibrium in an Open Financial Market
T'he government chooses a (the share of the projects's revenues that corresponds to the financier
in case of default) after credit contracts are set. As in the closed economy, if the government
decides to favor the entrepreneurs, it will implement a lower a, which will result in a lower
investment level. When the market is open to international capital inflows, a new effect is
introduced. The government, who only considers local investors and entrepreneurs in its ob-
,ective function, will use a to redistribute resources from foreigner lenders to local borrowers.
'ihis ex-post optimal policy is foreseen by the participants in the financial market and will end
up reducing the equilibrium level of investment. The benefits from opening the market are
therefore reduced.
'efinition 11 Given a set of parameters {, , r}, the Policy Equilibrium is a vector
1A w, P.,f } that satisfies:
i o , Wik*, {[z }W, P, 1pf is a Credit Market Equilibrium given a
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ii) a maximizes government's welfare function given {k, {pi)w, P, p
max 0 Eu (c{S) f (Wi dWI + (1 -0) j E (c ) f (kj) dkj
s.t.
(4.13), (4.4)
Combining (4.13), (4.15), (4.2), and (4.3), the welfare of consumers and entrepreneurs are
given by:
Eu (cC) dWi Eu (Wi) f (Wi) dWi + Eu (ps (Wi - )) f (W) dWi
where: Ps = pioN + (1 - 0 ) r
E (cE) dkj = E (R- Ns) f (kj) dkj + kjf (kj) dkj
Taking P, k and WO* as given, the optimal a [0,1] satisfies the following first order
condition:
foc(a): 'o Pr(Wi > W*) - (1 - 0) Pr(kj < k) = 0
PL
As in the closed economy, the government implements a larger a if the number of local
investors is larger -i.e. Pr (Wi > W*)-. And the ex-post optimal a decreases in the number of
entrepreneurs -i.e. Pr (kj < k) -.
The Policy Equilibrium is represented in Figure 4-10. Different foreseen policies imply dif-
ferent Credit Market Equilibria {ko, {i}W , P , pf },which determines an ex-post government's
policy a. The rational expectation equilibrium corresponds to the intersection with the 45
degree line, in which the foreseen a is equal to the ex-post optimal.
Combining (4.17), (4.16), and the fact that Pr (kj < ko) = k, in equilibrium the policy a
satisfies:
0 Pr (W > W) (-RL (4.20)(1-0) WFM
The equilibrium policy a increases in the proportion of local investors relative to the size of
the financial market. For that reason, an increase in capital inflows results unambiguously in
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lower ca:
0 Pr (W >W,)OdWFM 0 1 & Pr (W > Wo)
&aTJ4f (1- ) WFM AWf (1 - 0) WIM OWf
+ ( a - QRO) aWl J o RL (4.21)
First, when foreign capital inflows increase, the number of local entrepreneurs that access
;; credit increases. While foreign investors do not enter in the government's objective function,
.ocal entrepreneurs do. The government will therefore reduce a to protect domestic borrowers.
This effect corresponds to the first term in equation (4.21). Second, foreign capital inflows tend
to crowd out local investors. Since an increase in Wf reduces the return on domestic loans (see
equation (4.18)), fewer local investors will pay the access cost. This effect is represented in the
3econd term in equation (4.21).5 And finally, foreign capital inflows result in lower portfolio
share dedicated to risky projects, which is collected in the last term in equation (4.21).6
Notice that the negative effect of foreign capital inflows on a is lower when the original
:.ze of the financial market is large. So economies a with bigger financial market will tend to
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a Pr(w>w) (w> ) a ap < 
awf aw aP awf
6 a_. _W all aP o 
awf a aw. 
I
preserve higher a after the integration with the international market. The resulting level of
investment will be higher in those economies.
Oa 02alim -o 0 < 
WFM- t dWf OW W FM
The effect of wealth distribution on the equilibrium policy a depends crucially on the ratio
of the capital inflows to local wealth. Combining equations (4.20) and (4.19), the effect of w on
a is the following
O a_ 0 1 Wf W - E (W) _ Pr (W > W) 2 (4.22)
aw 1 - 0 oRL WFM 2w2 2 WFM
The second term in equation (4.22) corresponds to the increase in the number of entrepre-
neurs when the upper tail of the distribution (who already participate in the financial sector)
gets richer and increase their lending. Any increase in the number of entrepreneurs negatively
affects a.
The first term in equation (4.22) represents the change in the number of local investors.
From equation (4.19), if the ratio of capital inflows to domestic wealth is small such that
W < E (W), a mean preserving spread reduces the participation of local investors. In that
case, this term is negative. Unambiguously, the equilibrium policy a lowers in w:
Oa
<O
Ow
On the other hand, if that ratio of capital inflows to domestic wealth is small such that
Wo > E (W), from equation (4.19), a mean preserving spread increases the number of local
financiers and incentives the government to increase a. The first term in (4.22) is positive in
this case.
The effect of w on a is ambiguous when Wj > E (W), and depends on the original wealth
distribution. When the wealth distribution is even, no local investors participate in the financial
market and the equilibrium policy attains its minimum when w = 0. Any increase in w implies
a higher equilibrium policy a. On the other hand, if w is large, the effect of a mean preserving
spread increases the ratio of entrepreneurs to local financiers. The government reduces investor
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Figure 4-11: Investment and wealth distribution
protection in that case.
lim-> 0
-o -W
lim < 0
WO- w
Figure (4-11) plots aggregate investment as a function of w for the case where VV > E (W).
As explained in the previous section, for a constant a, the level of investment increases in w.
Once a is endogenized, aggregate investment attains its maximum for intermediate values of w.
These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Pi oposition 11 In equilibrium, the policy c is characterized by
i) The policy a decreases in Wf
Oa
--- <0
ii) The negative effect of Wf on a is lower when the size of the financial market is larger.
lim -o 0
WFM-- O f
02 QC
OWf WFM
iii) If the ratio Wf to E (W) is small enough so that E (W) > W*, then
Oa
a <o
11.6
r. .
6
Z
9
L
V
iv) If the ratio Wf to E (W) is large enough so that E (W) < W, then:
lima > 0 lim < 0
w-O dOw W-O a
4.7 Conclusions
The model presented in this paper analyzes the change in the economic environment after
capital account liberalization. The existence of foreign investors exacerbates government's moral
.hazard. In particular, since the government does not consider foreign investors in its objective
function, it will tend to reduce the level of investor protection in an attempt to favor local
borrowers. However, in doing so, the government also affects the welfare of local investors.
Therefore, the optimal level of investor protection is a function of the ratio of local to foreign
financiers participating in the domestic financial sector, which depends on level and distribution
of income in the economy.
In economies with high income per capita, the participation of local investors in the domestic
financial market is large. The government finds it optimal to maintain high levels of investor
protection even if the capital account is open to foreign capitals. Furthermore, the participation
of local investors is higher when the income distribution is even. The government's moral hazard
that results from opening the capital account attains its minimum in that case. Therefore,
higher investor protection and international integration are associated with economies with
more even income distributions. These findings are consistent with the fact that even income
distributions and financial liberalization are positively correlated in rich economies.
On the other hand, in poor economies capital inflows are large relative to the size of the
domestic financial market. The ratio of local entrepreneurs to local investors is high and the
government finds it optimal to set low levels of investor protection. Moreover, in poor economies
large capital inflows tend to crowd-out local investors, which reinforces government's incentives
to set a low level of investor protection. The crowding out effect is larger in poor economies with
an even wealth distribution. This finding is consistent with the fact that, among poor countries,
those with unequal income distributions show a higher level of financial liberalization.
The model presented in this paper also analyzes the impact of capital account liberalization
on the level of domestic investment and welfare of local investors. Financial integration enables
117
The entry of foreign capital, which reduces the cost of finance for local entrepreneurs and results
in a larger aggregate investment. However, foreign capital inflows crowd out local investors. The
entry of foreign investors ends up reducing the equilibrium return on domestic assets and fewer
local agents will participate in the financial market. If this crowding-out effect is important,
the welfare of local investors is reduced with the financial integration.
International integration also opens diversification opportunities to local investors. This
new investment opportunity increases investors' welfare. However, it also reduces the optimal
share invested in local projects. If the attractiveness of international assets is large, aggregate
investment could be lower after the integration.
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